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The United States Air Force (USAF) spends billions of dollars each year on procurement 
contracts ranging from simple services to major weapons systems acquisitions. While 
procurement spending provides the USAF with access to specialized services that would 
not normally be available within the Department of Defense, procurement fraud is an 
unfortunate byproduct of the acquisition process. As the primary agency responsible for 
investigating incidents of major procurement fraud in the USAF, the Air Force Office of 
Special Investigations (AFOSI) has developed and implemented a number of specific 
training programs that focus on anti-fraud and financial crimes education for the special 
agents assigned to conduct fraud investigations.  
In an effort to foster continued program improvement, this research compared 
AFOSI anti-fraud training curriculum and certification requirements with the professional 
standard anti-fraud certification requirements established by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE). The comparison identified gaps and overlaps between the 
AFOSI training requirements and the ACFE certification requirements. 
This research identified that approximately two-thirds of the knowledge 
competencies overlapped between the two sets of requirements. The overlaps implied a 
common understanding between the two organizations regarding the knowledge 
competencies necessary for an individual to possess in order to adequately investigate 
fraud. The gaps in knowledge competencies between the two organizations were 
attributed to differences in purview, organizational mission, and jurisdiction between the 
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Acquisition and contracting play significant roles in achieving government 
effectiveness and efficiency. Procuring products and services has become a standard 
practice in fulfilling government requirements. Whether contracting with a private 
company to provide services at a lesser cost to the government or acquiring complex 
technology that is beyond the scope of traditional agency capabilities, contract spending 
provides the United States Air Force (USAF) with access to specialized services not 
organic to the Department of Defense (DOD).  
The USAF spends billions of dollars a year on contracts ranging from simple 
services to major weapons systems. In fiscal year (FY) 2014 alone, $18.8 billion was 
budgeted for “blue”—USAF only—procurement (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense/Comptroller, 2013). Government funding for defense acquisition is a finite 
resource, and those entrusted with the authority to obligate taxpayer dollars should do so 
with the greatest responsibility.  
In an effort to establish a system that promotes fiscal responsibility and 
stewardship, the federal government and subordinate agencies, such as the DOD, have 
utilized a contract management process. The contract management process is predicated 
on statutory requirements and regulations that seek to standardize and manage the 
procurement process to limit fraud, waste, and abuse, and provide the end customer with 
the best product available in a timely manner (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR] 
1.102). 
As with any established process, the contract management process is not immune 
to fraud, waste and abuse. Procurement fraud has been prevalent throughout the history 
of government acquisition (Davidson, 1997). Fraud is prevalent in government 
contracting due to multiple factors. These factors include weak internal controls that are 
often present in large bureaucratic structures, government and contractor employees who 
justify fraud as a victimless crime, an overall apathetic atmosphere within DOD towards 
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deterring fraudulent activity, and the large amount of government spending that will 
always attract individuals willing to engage in illegal activity for monetary gain (Lander, 
Kimball & Martyn, 2008).  
In addition to the fiscal responsibilities associated with government spending, all 
government agencies must have an effective process in place to detect and prevent 
fraudulent activity within their departments. The USAF established the Air Force Office 
of Special Investigations (AFOSI) to help combat fraud within Air Force procurement 
channels. The AFOSI was founded in 1948, primarily in reaction to a widely publicized 
criminal prosecution involving a high-ranking USAF general officer charged with 
multiple counts of fraud (Kidwell, 2014). AFOSI founders worked closely with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to design a functional organizational structure that 
would address various forms of criminal activity. Similar to the FBI, the AFOSI took on 
the responsibility of investigating all felony-level crimes involving USAF personnel and 
assets, including fraud and financial crimes. The AFOSI also became the lead authority 
on counterintelligence matters affecting USAF interests.  
The AFOSI’s wide range of responsibilities poses additional challenges aside 
from those found in day-to-day operations. AFOSI special agents assigned to major 
procurement fraud positions are required to possess a distinctive knowledge base due to 
investigative complexities not normally found in general criminal or counterintelligence 
investigations. To address the specialized knowledge required throughout fraud 
investigations, the AFOSI has developed and implemented a set of knowledge 
competencies all special agents must possess to be considered fully qualified, referred to 
throughout the agency as credentialed. Additionally, the AFOSI established a number of 
specific continuing education training programs that focus on anti-fraud and financial 
crimes. 
With ever-changing economic conditions facing every marketplace, the 
importance placed on fraud awareness has considerably increased in the non-government 
sector over the past few decades. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
has quickly emerged as the industry standard for fraud examination expertise. The ACFE 
was founded by Dr. Joseph Wells, who had worked as both an accountant and an FBI 
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agent (ACFE, 2014b). From his experience, Dr. Wells identified a gap between 
accountants and auditors with extensive knowledge of finance and the law enforcement 
professionals charged with conducting criminal investigations. Dr. Wells wanted to 
combine the expert knowledge from both industries to fill the capability gap and provide 
fraud examiner education to both finance and law enforcement professionals alike. The 
ACFE is now the largest organization in the world that specializes in anti-fraud and 
financial crimes training and education. With membership numbering at approximately 
75,000, the ACFE is the organization recognized for its expertise in anti-fraud education 
and training (ACFE, 2014b).  Like the ACFE, the AFOSI places significant emphasis on 
preparing its personnel for success in fraud investigations. 
The continuous improvement and development of personnel is a large part of the 
foundational pillar of the AFOSI (“AFOSI Mission, Vision, & Vector,” n.d.). To 
objectively compare the current status of the AFOSI anti-fraud training program, this 
research project uses the ACFE’s Fraud Examiners Manual as the professional standard 
body of knowledge in terms of curricular and knowledge required for fraud examination 
and certification. Similar to the AFOSI, the ACFE was established to fill a need for 
professionals disciplined in fraud examination. The goal of this research is to extend the 
AFOSI foundation by addressing gaps and overlaps between AFOSI and ACFE anti-
fraud competencies to achieve overall training process improvement. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project answers the following research questions: 
1. What are the ACFE professional fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies required for certification? 
2. What are the AFOSI fraud investigation knowledge competencies required 
for credentialing? 
3. How do the ACFE and AFOSI required fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies compare? 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to identify the specific fraud investigation 
knowledge competencies required by both the AFOSI and ACFE for credentialing and/or 
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professional certification. Required competencies for each agency are analyzed and 
compared to determine whether any gaps and/or overlaps exist between the AFOSI and 
ACFE. The comparison addresses any similarities or differences between AFOSI fraud 
investigation knowledge competencies and the professional fraud investigation 
knowledge competencies (hereafter referred to as knowledge competencies) established 
by the ACFE. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research consists of a literature review and a 
comparative analysis.  This literature review identifies the specific requirements that the 
AFOSI and the ACFE have identified as necessary competencies to conduct fraud 
investigations. The AFOSI fraud knowledge competencies are required to be considered a 
fully credentialed special agent, while the ACFE competencies are required to earn the 
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) certification. Clearly identifying each specific 
competency allows for a viable comparative analysis. 
This comparative analysis compares the AFOSI and ACFE required knowledge 
competencies to determine whether any gaps and/or overlaps exist between AFOSI fraud 
investigation competencies for credentialing and ACFE fraud investigation competencies 
for certification. 
E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The benefits associated with this research consist of a breakdown of AFOSI and 
ACFE required fraud knowledge competencies, including a comparative analysis of both 
sets of competencies. The comparative analysis provides agency leadership with a well-
defined snapshot of how well AFOSI competency requirements compare to ACFE 
competency requirements. Competency gaps or overlaps could be used to adequately 
define the level of preparation AFOSI special agents receive to appropriately conduct 
fraud investigations. Moreover, any identified gaps should provide a solid starting point 
for assessing the effectiveness of agency anti-fraud training. 
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A major limitation of this research is that it uses only one source, the ACFE’s 
Fraud Examiners Manual, as a professional standard body of knowledge. Furthermore, 
the research does not incorporate the required knowledge competencies from any other 
military criminal investigative organizations (MCIOs), such as the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS) and Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), nor 
does it include other federal agencies’ required knowledge competencies, such as the 
FBI. The absence of additional criminal investigative service knowledge competencies 
limits the ability to establish a suitable baseline or conduct a comparative analysis 
between federal agencies. Finally, this research analyzes solely federal agency 
competency requirements, specifically the AFOSI’s, which, unlike non-government 
organizations such as the ACFE, are often driven by official government policy and 
statutory regulations. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This research paper consists of five chapters. Chapter I includes pertinent 
background information, the purpose of this research and subsequent research questions, 
the methodology used, benefits and limitations, organization of report, and a summary. 
Chapter II includes a background of the ACFE and a literature review of the professional 
standards and knowledge competencies that the ACFE requires for certification as a fraud 
examiner. Chapter III includes a background of the AFOSI and a literature review of the 
knowledge competencies required to become a credentialed special agent. Chapter IV 
includes the comparative analysis of the knowledge competencies identified by the ACFE 
and AFOSI, as well as recommendations on how to improve anti-fraud training within the 
AFOSI. Chapter V presents a summary and conclusion of the research and identifies 
possible areas for further research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the background for this research paper. It included the 
research questions and the purpose of the research. Additionally, this chapter provided 
the methodology used to address the research questions and the benefits and limitations 
associated with the completion of this research. Finally, this chapter explained the 
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organization of this research paper. The following chapter consists of a literature review 
concerning the history of the ACFE and the fraud investigation knowledge competencies 
required for ACFE certification.  
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II. ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter II provides an overview of fraud as well as a background on the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) organization. In addition, the chapter 
explains the requirements for obtaining and maintaining certification as a fraud examiner 
under the ACFE. Finally, the chapter identifies the ACFE competencies, all of which are 
contained in the Fraud Examiners Manual. Although the ACFE does not have an official 
body of knowledge, this research project treats the Fraud Examiners Manual as a de 
factor body of knowledge as it contains all of the ACFE fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies, hereafter referred to as knowledge competencies.   
B. OVERVIEW OF FRAUD 
Merriam-Webster defines fraud as the “intentional perversion of truth in order to 
induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right” or more 
simply “an act of deceiving or misrepresenting” (“Fraud, n.d.). The ACFE utilizes 
Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition that fraud is a “knowing misrepresentation of the 
truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment” 
(“Fraud,” 2004). Famed criminologist Donald R. Cressey (1973) identified the 
components that now comprise the fraud triangle as a means of explaining why fraud 
occurs. He hypothesized:  
Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves 
as having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware this 
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial 
trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation 
verbalizations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves 
as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as users of the 
entrusted funds or property. (Cressey, 1973, p. 30) 
As illustrated in Figure 1, Cressey (1973) believed that an individual commits 
fraud when three factors are present: pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. Pressure 
refers to an individual’s motivation to commit the fraud. When individuals are faced with 
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a financial problem, whether personal or professional, that they are unable to solve 
through legitimate means, they begin to contemplate committing fraud as a means of 
resolving their problem. Examples of pressures that commonly lead to fraud are living 
beyond one’s means, immediate financial need, debts, poor credit, drug or gambling 
addiction, and/or family pressure (Biegelman, 2013). 
The opportunity portion of the triangle refers to individuals identifying 
circumstances and/or vulnerabilities within their company that they can exploit for 
personal gain (Wells, 2005). The individual identifies a way to use his or her position to 
commit the fraud and believes that there is a low risk of getting caught (ACFE, 2014e) 
Examples of such vulnerabilities include a lack of oversight or supervision or too much 
trust/responsibility placed in one individual (Wells, 2005). Rationalization refers to how 
the fraudsters justify the crime to themselves. Most are first-time offenders who see 
themselves as “ordinary, honest people who are caught in a bad set of circumstances” 
(ACFE, 2014f). Rationalization allows them to view the crime as justified or acceptable. 
Common rationalizations include the individuals feel they were owed the money, their 
employer deserved it, or that fraud is a victimless crime (Biegelman, 2013).  
 
Figure 1.  The Fraud Triangle (from Thoresen, Diaby, Helle, Condon & Hodge, 
2013) 
A variation on the fraud triangle theory is the fraud diamond (Figure 2). 
Hermanson and Wolfe (2004) added a fourth dimension to the Fraud Triangle: capability. 
An individual must have the necessary traits and abilities to commit the fraud. These 
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traits and abilities include intelligence, self-confidence, and “being able to handle the 
stress that occurs when perpetrating fraud” (Biegelman, 2013, p. 10; Hermanson & 
Wolfe, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.  The Fraud Diamond (from Hermanson & Wolf, 2004) 
Within the DOD environment, one may hear the phrase “fraud, waste, and abuse” 
in reference to procurement spending. Although these terms are sometimes treated as 
interchangeable, it is worth noting that they have different definitions. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) defines fraud as “any intentional deception taken for the 
purpose of inducing DOD action or reliance on that deception. Fraud can be perpetrated 
by DOD personnel—whether civilian or military—or by contractors and their 
employees” (GAO, 2006, p. 3). GAO (2006) also defines waste as “the extravagant, 
careless, or needless expenditure of DOD funds or the consumption of DOD property that 
results from deficient practices, systems, controls, or decisions. Waste includes improper 
practices not involving prosecutable fraud” (p. 3). Finally, GAO (2006) defines abuse as 
“the manner in which resources or programs are managed that creates or perpetuates 
waste or contributes to acts of fraud. Abuse is also called mismanagement” (p. 3). 
The literature review identified certain knowledge areas as common for fraud 
investigation.  These included the various fraud schemes, the law as it relates to fraud, 
ethics, and fraud prevention.  Other common knowledge areas identified in the literature 
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review pertained specifically to investigating fraud.  These knowledge areas included 
how to conduct a fraud investigation/examination, obtaining and handling evidence, as 
well as different kinds of interviews to conduct in support of a fraud 
investigation/examination.   
According to the ACFE Report to the Nations (ACFE, 2014a), the average firm 
loses approximately five percent of annual revenues to fraud. From a global perspective, 
that amounts to a loss of almost $3.7 trillion (ACFE, 2014a). At the same time, there are 
significant indirect costs associated with fraud. These include “lost productivity, 
reputational damage and the related loss of business, as well as the costs associated with 
investigation and remediation of the issues that allowed them to occur” (ACFE, 2014a, p. 
8). Of the approximately 1400 certified fraud examiners surveyed for the Report to the 
Nations, the ACFE (2014a) found that dollar losses ranged from less than $200,000 to 
over a million dollars. Approximately, 15 percent of the cases were related to government 
entities, with a median loss of $90,000 (ACFE, 2014a). Looking at industries victimized 
by fraud, government and public administration was second only to banking and financial 
services in terms of frequency of cases (ACFE, 2014a). The median duration of all the 
fraud schemes surveyed was 18 months (ACFE, 2014a). 
The ACFE Report to the Nations (2014a) included an entire section on 
occupational fraud. Occupational fraud was defined as those crimes in which “an 
employee, manager, officer, or owner of an organization commits fraud to the detriment 
of that organization” (ACFE, 2014e, p. 1.201). The ACFE has classified all related fraud 
schemes into three main categories: asset misappropriation, corruption, and financial 
statement fraud (ACFE, 2014a). Known as the fraud tree, this classification of schemes is 
reproduced in Appendix A. Approximately 30 percent of the cases surveyed in the ACFE 
study involved more than one type of occupational fraud scheme (ACFE, 2014a).  
Asset misappropriation can be defined as “the misuse of any company asset for 
personal gain” (Wells, 2005). The Fraud Examiners Manual (ACFE, 2014e) identifies 
three main categories of asset misappropriation, which include cash, fraudulent 
disbursements, and inventory/other assets. Cash schemes include skimming and larceny. 
Skimming refers to theft of money before it is recorded on the victim organization’s 
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books. Larceny refers to theft of money after it has been recorded on the victim 
organization’s books. Fraudulent disbursements include schemes such as fictitious 
employees or expenses, falsified wages, and shell companies. The term shell company 
refers to a “fictitious entity created for the sole purpose of committing fraud” (Wells, 
2005, p. 122). Inventory/other asset schemes include misuse and larceny of an 
organization’s tangible property. Examples of these schemes in a procurement 
environment include a contractor billing the government for fraudulent expenses or ghost 
employees.  Ghost employees are employees who either do not exist, or do not actually 
work for the company. The term corruption describes 
various types of wrongful acts designed to cause some unfair advantage, 
and it can take on many forms. Generally, corruption refers to the 
wrongful use of influence to procure a benefit for the actor or another 
person, contrary to the rights of others. (ACFE, 2014e, p. 1.601) 
In an organization, the area that sees the highest incidents of corruption is the purchasing 
section (ACFE, 2014e). Furthermore, “most corruption schemes involve employees 
acting alone or employees and vendors/contractors acting in collusion” (ACFE, 2014e, p. 
1601). An example of corruption in a procurement environment includes a contracting 
officer accepting a bribe or gratuity in exchange for awarding a contract to a specific 
contractor or vendor. A real world example of this would be the case of Darleen Druyun, 
an Air Force acquisition official who used her position to steer contracts to Boeing. In 
return, Druyun received follow on positions with Boeing for herself and family members 
(Mokhiber, 2003; Weissman, 2004).  
The term financial statement fraud refers to “the deliberate misrepresentation of 
the financial condition of an enterprise accomplished through the intentional 
misstatement or omission of amounts or disclosures in the financial statements to deceive 
financial statement users” (ACFE, 2014e, p. 1.203). Financial statement fraud usually 
involves an organization overstating its assets while understanding its liabilities (ACFE, 
2014e). A real world example of financial statement fraud would be the Enron scandal, in 
which the company neglected to report billions of dollars of debt, thus giving the 
appearance that the company was more lucrative (Chandra, Ettredge, & Stone, 2006). 
The opposite approach—— understating assets and overstating liabilities—— can also be 
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seen in incidents of financial statement fraud. Specifically, an example of financial 
statement fraud within the procurement environment would be a contractor who 
understates his or her revenues or number of personnel in order to maintain small 
business status.  Having established an overview of fraud, the next section will discuss 
the background of the ACFE. 
C. ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS BACKGROUND 
Dr. Joseph T. Wells began his career as an audit staff member with Coopers and 
Lybrand (now PriceWaterhouseCoopers) (ACFE, 2014b). After two years with the 
company, he became a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As 
an agent, Dr. Wells developed his skills investigating all types of fraud cases. After ten 
years with the FBI, Dr. Wells left government work and formed his company, Wells & 
Associates (ACFE 2014b). Wells & Associates was comprised of criminologists who 
specialized in “fraud detection and deterrence” (ACFE, 2014b).  
Six years later, in 1988, Dr. Wells established the ACFE. Through discussions 
with his colleague, Dr. Donald Cressey, Dr. Wells realized that efforts to investigate and 
prevent fraud were often executed by two entirely separate groups: “accountants who 
didn’t know anything about investigating fraud, and investigators who didn’t know 
anything about accounting” (ACFE, 2013, p. 1). With the establishment of the ACFE, Dr. 
Wells combined the knowledge of these two disciplines under one organization.  
The ACFE was the first organization dedicated solely to fraud detection and 
deterrence. Since its inception, few other organizations have successfully established 
themselves for the purpose of preventing and detecting fraud. To date, the ACFE remains 
the premier organization for anti-fraud efforts, with more than 70,000 members 
worldwide (ACFE, 2014a, p. 79).  
Further reinforcing the ACFE’s prominence in the field of fraud is the extensive 
list of authors who cite the ACFE and its products in their works. Biegelman (2013) and 
O’Gara (2004) both cite ACFE statistics and teachings when discussing principles of 
fraud and its prevention and detection. Other authors include Ziegenfuss (2001), Saksena 
(2010), and Daigle, Hayes, and Morris (2014). Authors referencing the ACFE from 
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international perspectives include Kiymet and Crowther (2006), Peltier-Rivest (2009), 
and Sánchez (2010). Even textbooks offering guidance on fraud examination and 
investigation utilize the ACFE as a reference source (Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, & 
Zimbelman, 2012; Silverstone & Davia, 2005; Wells, 2005). With this context in mind, 
the next section will address the certification requirements for the ACFE. 
D. ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS CERTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
For the purposes of this research, the requirements for the ACFE certified fraud 
examiner (CFE) are treated as the counterpart to the requirements for the AFOSI special 
agent. There are several requirements for an individual to achieve, and maintain, status as 
a CFE. To become a CFE, an individual must have earned 50 points in the ACFE’s point 
system. This is accomplished through education and work experience. An individual 
must have at least two years of industry-specific experience. “Industry-specific” includes 
experience in the fields of accounting and auditing, criminology and sociology, fraud 
investigation, loss prevention, and law (ACFE, 2014c).  
Within the ACFE website, individuals may input their number of years of 
experience and their level of education (ACFE, 2014c). The website then calculates a 
score for the individual. Each year of work experience directly or indirectly related to 
fraud is worth five points. Completion of a bachelor’s degree or equivalent is worth 40 
points. Each master’s degree or equivalent is worth 5 points, while each PhD or 
equivalent is worth 10 points. Individuals may also earn 10 points for each additional 
professional certification (ACFE, 2014c). Appendix B lists the ACFE approved 
professional certifications for point purposes. For the purpose of this research, the 
previously mentioned CFE certification requirements are provided for general 
understanding only. This research and analysis focuses primarily on the CFE examination 
and certification requirement, as discussed in the next section.  
To earn the CFE credential, an individual must also sit for and pass a 
comprehensive exam with a score of 75 percent or better. The exam consists of four 
sections, with 125 questions per section. The four sections are broken down by subject 
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matter to reflect the four-volume structure of the Fraud Examiners Manual (ACFE, 
2014e), which will be discussed later. The goal of the exam is not that a CFE should be 
an expert in every type of fraud. Rather, the exam is intended to ensure CFEs have a 
basic working knowledge of aspects of all types of fraud.  
Once certified, CFEs must fulfill annual continuing professional education (CPE) 
requirements in order to maintain their certification. Of the total 20 CPE hours per year, 
two of these hours must be courses focused on ethics, 10 hours must be courses focused 
on anti-fraud, and eight hours in any subject matter related to fraud. This continuing 
education serves to keep members current on advancements and information within the 
fraud community.  
The previously discussed requirements were established by the ACFE Board of 
Regents. The board consists of five voting members, who serve two-year terms. When 
establishing the CFE requirements, the board looked to mirror the requirements after 
those of other professional certifications, such as the certified public accountant (CPA) 
certification.  Having established the requirements to become a Certified Fraud Examiner 
with the ACFE, the next section will discuss the ACFE fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies. 
E. DETERMINING THE ACFE FRAUD INVESTIGATION KNOWLEDGE 
COMPETENCIES 
The Fraud Examiners Manual is considered the ACFE’s de facto body of 
knowledge. The first edition of the manual was written in 1989. To develop the manual, 
Dr. Wells compiled information from various subject matter experts (SMEs) from fields 
such as accounting, auditing, legal, and criminology. The manual is reviewed each year 
by a team of professionals. Each team member reviews those sections of the manual 
pertaining to his or her area of expertise. Any information that needs to be added or 
revised is submitted for inclusion in that year’s edition of the manual. In addition, new 
information can be submitted from SMEs in the field.  
The manual itself is divided into four volumes, with each volume addressing a 
specific topic area to include financial transactions and fraud schemes, law, investigation, 
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and fraud prevention and deterrence. The following sections provide a brief description 
of each volume and its contents. The ACFE knowledge competency model, created for 
this research project and found in Appendix C, offers a visual breakdown of the manual 
and its knowledge competencies.  
Volume I of the Fraud Examiners Manual covers financial transactions and fraud 
schemes (ACFE, 2014e). It consists of three main sections: financial transactions, 
occupational fraud schemes, and other fraud schemes. The financial transactions section 
includes knowledge on accounting concepts. The competencies listed under occupational 
fraud schemes include financial statement fraud, asset misappropriation (cash receipts, 
fraudulent disbursements, and inventory/other assets), and bribery and corruption. Other 
fraud schemes include financial institution fraud, check and credit card fraud, theft of 
intellectual property, insurance fraud, health-care fraud, consumer fraud, computer and 
internet fraud, and contract/procurement fraud.  
Burguet and Che (2004) argue that bribery in the competitive procurement 
environment is widespread.  To illustrate the scope and magnitude of the issue, Burguet 
and Che cite a 1988 investigation that looked specifically at defense procurement fraud.  
This investigation alone led to the “conviction of 46 individuals and 6 defense 
corporations, with fines and penalties totaling $190 million” (Burguet & Che, 2004, p. 
50-51). 
Osei-Tutu, Badu, and Owusu-Manu (2009) add to the discussion by stating the 
dollar value for bribes occurring annually in public procurement is between $390-$400 
billion.  Relating this fact back to the larger umbrella of corruption, Osei-Tutu, et al. 
(2009) contend that corruption has an impact beyond the procurement environment.  
Specifically, corruption “hinders economic development, reduces social services, [and] 
diverts investments in infrastructure and social services” (Osei-Tutu, et al., 2009, p. 237). 
In 2004 alone, the estimated losses from the theft of intellectual property were 
$250 billion and rising (Settle, Passyn, Diriker, & DiBartolo, 2010). By comparison, as of 
1998, losses from computer fraud were estimated at approximately $9 billion (Casabona 
& Yu, 1998). Casabona and Yu (1998) discuss the variety of violations encompassed in 
computer crime, which include theft of money, illegal trespasses, theft of services, 
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damage to software, alteration of data, and theft of information. Miyazaki (2009) 
contends that insurance claim fraud is the most common insurance fraud scheme. 
Furthermore, fraud “costs insurance companies, policymakers, and taxpayers billions of 
dollars every year and has been described as the second largest white collar crime” 
(Miyazaki, 2009, p. 589). 
Looking specifically at military procurement, Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999) 
show how attractive this “big business” (p. 810) can be to fraudsters.  From 1981 to 1995, 
26 percent of defense outlays, as well as 1.43 percent of the gross national product, went 
towards military procurement (Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999).  As of 2006, 
procurement was estimated to consume more than one-third of all government outlays 
(Schapper, Veiga, Malta, & Gilbert, 2006). 
Similar to the ACFE, O’Gara (2004) identified several schemes of major fraud, 
including misappropriation, corruption, bribery, fraudulent financial reporting, and price 
fixing/bid rigging. GAO identified similar fraud schemes that specifically impact the 
DOD, which included “creating or altering documents (e.g., claims, travel vouchers, 
invoices); forging signatures; or establishing false accounts for fictitious people or 
companies” (GAO, 1998, p. 18).  
Volume II of the Fraud Examiners Manual covers law and also consists of three 
main sections: an overview, punishing offenders, and practice and procedure (ACFE, 
2014e). The overview consists of a synopsis of the U.S. legal system, the law as it relates 
to fraud, bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. The section 
on punishing offenders contains two competencies: criminal prosecutions and the civil 
justice system. The practice and procedure section contains the competencies such as 
individual rights during examinations, basic principles of evidence, and expert witness 
testifying. The impact of prosecution and punishing offenders is worth noting. As 
Biegelman (2013) explained, “Prosecutions, convictions, and the resulting prison 
sentences are a deterrent to fraudsters” (p. 247).  
As indicated by the competencies of Volume II, fraudsters can be punished under 
the civil justice system as well as the criminal justice system. A main distinction between 
criminal and civil law is that criminal law addresses “offenses of a public nature” while 
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civil law “provides remedies for violations of private rights” (Albrecht et al., 2012, pp. 
14–15). To successfully prosecute fraud criminally or civilly, however, proving the 
perpetrator’s intent to defraud the victim is necessary (Albrecht et al., 2012).  
The ACFE 2014 Report to the Nations includes the case results of the 
approximately 1400 CFEs surveyed (ACFE, 2014a). Under the criminal justice system, 
56.5 percent of perpetrators pled guilty or no contest, 18.2 percent were convicted at trial, 
and 9.0 percent were acquitted (ACFE, 2014a). In addition, attorneys declined to 
prosecute 15.4 percent of the cases and the remaining 0.9 percent of cases were labeled as 
“other,” with no explanation as to what that meant (ACFE, 2014a, p. 65). For the cases 
that led to civil suits under the civil justice system, 51.4 percent resulted in a ruling in 
favor of the victim, 30.6 percent were settled, and 13.9 percent yielded a ruling in favor 
of the perpetrator (ACFE, 2014a). The remaining 4.2 percent were labeled as “other” 
with no explanation as to what that meant (ACFE, 2014a, p. 66). 
Volume III of the Fraud Examiners Manual covers investigation (ACFE, 2014e). 
This volume consists of four main sections: investigation procedures, interviewing, 
gathering information, and analyzing evidence. The competencies included under 
investigation procedures are planning and conducting a fraud examination and report 
writing. The competencies included under the interviewing section are interview theory 
and application and interviewing suspects and signed statements. The section on 
gathering information includes the competencies of covert examinations, sources of 
information, and tracing illicit transactions. The competencies included under analyzing 
evidence are document analysis, data analysis and reporting tools, and digital forensics.  
Similar to the competencies covered in Volume III, O’Gara (2004) encourages 
investigators to gather information and provides guidance on how to analyze that 
information. O’Gara (2004) also encourages investigators to conduct interviews, but 
cautions investigators to remember the difference between an interview and an 
interrogation: “an interview is open-ended . . . the purpose is to obtain information. An 
interrogation is accusatory, designed to elicit a confession” (O’Gara, 2004, p. 140).  
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As there are different types of interviews, there are also different types of 
questions one might utilize. These include introductory questions, assessment questions, 
informational questions, admission seeking questions, and closing questions (Albrecht et 
al., 2012; Wells, 2005).  
Biegelman (2013) also offers tips to fraud examiners regarding investigation, 
including investigate as many types of fraud as possible, utilize teamwork, and obtain 
documentary evidence (including email) from as many sources as possible. Wells (2005) 
similarly describes a fraud examination as consisting of document examination, review of 
outside sources (i.e., public records), and interviews. Wells (2005) also advocates the 
fraud theory approach, which is comprised of four steps.  Wells (2005) encourages 
examiners and investigators to cycle through these steps continuously as they work 
through their investigation. The four steps are “1) Analyze available data; 2) Create a 
hypothesis; 3) Test the hypothesis; and 4) Refine and amend the hypothesis” (Wells, 
2005, p. 5). 
Once the investigation is completed, the examiner or investigator must capture the 
information in a fraud report. The Fraud Examiners Manual stresses the importance of 
maintaining a clear, concise writing style when drafting the report (ACFE, 2014e). 
Similar to the ACFE competencies, Albrecht et al. (2012) state reports must maintain a 
tone of neutrality and objectivity. 
Volume IV of the Fraud Examiners Manual covers fraud prevention and 
deterrence (ACFE, 2014e). This final volume consists of three main sections: 
understanding crime, fraud prevention, and ethics and fraud-related responsibilities. The 
section on understanding crime consists of two competencies: understanding criminal 
behavior and white collar crime. The section on fraud prevention consists of three 
competencies: fraud prevention programs, fraud risk assessment, and fraud risk 
management. The section on ethics and responsibilities contains the competencies of 
ethics for fraud examiners, corporate governance, management’s responsibilities, and 
auditors’ responsibilities.  
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The term white collar crime, coined by Edwin Sutherland, originally referred to 
those crimes committed by businessmen and organizations (Brody & Kiehl, 2010). As 
white collar crime has evolved, however, so has the definition. Brody and Kiehl (2010) 
explain the idea of white collar crime now focuses “more on the actual crime committed 
and less on the perpetrators” (p. 352). Examples of white collar crime include bribery, 
antitrust violations, forgery, identity theft, consumer fraud, and computer/internet fraud 
(Brody and Kiehl, 2010). 
The Fraud Examiners Manual utilizes the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) definition of corporate governance, stated as  
The procedures and processes according to which an organization is 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants 
in the organization—such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders—and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-
making. (Corporate Governance, 2005)  
An example of corporate governance failing is arguably the Enron scandal 
(Deakin & Konzelmann, 2003). Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) state that corporate 
governance received increased attention following the Enron and WorldCom scandals, 
which centered on accounting and financial reporting frauds. To prevent similar 
incidents, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Public Law No. 107-204, 2002), 
which “introduced new provisions for managers and directors regarding the proper 
functioning of the firm and for auditors and analysts responsible for information 
dissemination. Moreover, SOX raised the criminal penalties for securities fraud and any 
attempt to deliberately mislead shareholders and potential investors” (Leventis & 
Dimitropoulos, 2012, p. 162). Given such a context, it makes sense that the Fraud 
Examiners Manual would include a section dedicated to the proper way in which an 
organization operates, governs itself, and disseminates information. 
This volume emphasizes prevention and deterrence and being proactive towards 
fraud rather than reactive. These topics inlcude fraud risk assessment and fraud risk 
management, which are two concepts that often go hand in hand.  Knapp and Knapp 
(2001) explain that a thorough and well executed fraud risk assessment increases the 
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likelihood for detecting fraud.  Venter (2007) further advocated the argument that 
companies could help prevent fraud by proactively conducting fraud risk assessments and 
monitoring identified risks with subsequent fraud risk management endeavors.   
Biegelman (2013) echoed this sentiment in his work, offering recommendations 
for both individuals and companies on how to prevent and deter fraud. These 
recommendations include learning to identify the red flags for fraud, training yourself 
and employees on fraud prevention and detection, and reinforcing penalties against those 
who commit fraud (Biegelman, 2013). O’Gara (2004) took a similar point of view, 
stating, “Effective prevention depends on the probability of detection and prosecution 
more than on any other single factor” (p. 4). In other words, a proactive process for 
detecting fraud serves as an effective prevention mechanism. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of fraud. It also provided a background on the 
ACFE organization. In addition, the chapter detailed the requirements for obtaining and 
maintaining certification as a certified fraud examiner (CFE) under the ACFE. Finally, 
the chapter identified the ACFE fraud investigation knowledge competencies, all of 
which are contained in the Fraud Examiners Manual.  Although the ACFE does not have 
an official body of knowledge, this research project treats the Fraud Examiners Manual as 
a de factor body of knowledge as it contains all of the ACFE competencies.  The next 
chapter provides a background on the Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
(AFOSI), its certification requirements, and the competencies that make up the AFOSI 
body of knowledge. 
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III. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III provides a background of the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations (AFOSI). This chapter also identifies the three stages of training that all 
AFOSI special agents must complete and explains the process and purpose of 
credentialing. Finally, this chapter outlines the DOD’s process for developing knowledge 
competencies and identifies the fraud knowledge competencies required for AFOSI 
special agents to be considered fully credentialed.  
B. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS BACKGROUND 
In 1945, an anonymous letter surfaced at the FBI headquarters in Washington, 
DC, alleging serious acts of fraud and misconduct by Major General Bennett E. Meyers 
during World War II (Kidwell, 2014). Meyers was the director of the Air Technical 
Service Command at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio, which is now Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base. As director, Meyers had access to all contract proposals submitted by 
companies seeking to supply goods and services to the Army Air Corps. Meyers would 
select and review the high-dollar contract proposals and subsequently purchase stock in 
the company who submitted the lowest bid (Hagerty, 2000). These actions were not only 
an abuse of authority as Meyers used his position to gain access to sensitive bid 
information, but also provided Meyers with an unfair financial advantage through insider 
trading. Meyers was also later charged with awarding contracts to companies in which he 
had previously established a financial interest, even if the company did not submit a bid 
proposal. Due to unclear lines of investigative jurisdiction, the letter slowly made its way 
through military channels with little response from senior leadership. Two years later, the 
letter resurfaced and resulted in a string of Senate hearings. The Senate hearings were 
charged with determining why major acts of fraud by a general officer were never 
sufficiently investigated (Hagerty, 2000).  
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The Senate hearings identified that a significant lack of oversight and control of 
defense spending led to multiple unnecessary vulnerabilities within the procurement 
process. Additional testimony presented during the hearings identified an agreement 
made at the beginning of the war between the Justice Department, the FBI, and the 
military that criminal acts involving service members would be handled by the member’s 
corresponding service (Hagerty, 2000). The problem was an overall lack of adequate 
investigative resources available to handle many of the allegations involving service 
members, especially within the newly established USAF service branch. To address this 
capability gap, the Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, sought the advice of 
then-director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover. Through a collaborative effort between USAF 
Air Staff and the FBI, the AFOSI was established on August 1, 1948 (Kidwell, 2014). 
Since its inception, the AFOSI has been the Air Force’s premier criminal and 
counterintelligence investigative agency. The AFOSI’s mission statement, “Identify, 
exploit and neutralize criminal, terrorist and intelligence threats to the Air Force, 
Department of Defense, and U.S. government” is supported by six areas of operation, 
which include criminal investigations, fraud investigations, counterintelligence, 
expeditionary activities, special security services, and cyber investigations (AFOSI, 
2014). Although it was a procurement fraud investigation that ultimately led to the 
AFOSI’s founding, the agency has consistently had to adjust its focus between these 
areas of operation in order to address the ever-changing criminal and counterintelligence 
threats facing the Air Force.  
With the refocusing of military assets in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with 
budgetary cuts and an overall reduction in DOD spending, the focus on procurement 
fraud detection and prevention has gained momentum. In FY2010, the defense budget 
authorized $690.3 billion for defense spending, compared to $615.1 billion in FY2014 
(figures are in actual dollars and include spending for overseas contingency operations) 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Comptroller, 2013, p. 1-3). The $75.2 billion 
reduction has led many investigative agencies to refocus more on fraud detection and 
prevention in an effort to protect dwindling resources. 
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The AFOSI is not an exception to this trend. Since 2011, the AFOSI has seen a 
consistent increase in major procurement fraud case initiations: a 26.4 percent increase 
from calendar year (CY) 2011 to CY2012 and a 16.4 percent increase from CY2012 to 
CY2013 (“AFOSI CY Wrap Up,” 2013). Additionally, in October 2013, the AFOSI 
officially stood up the AFOSI Office of Procurement Fraud (PF). The PF branch of 
AFOSI was implemented to provide a more centralized and streamlined approach to 
conducting major procurement fraud investigations (Dillard, 2013). Centralizing major 
procurement fraud investigations enabled the AFOSI to increase investigative capability 
by bringing together a pool of special agents with a high amount of knowledge and 
experience investigating complex frauds. Finally, the creation of PF supported the 
AFOSI’s renewed focus on proactively detecting, deterring, and investigating fraudulent 
activity (Dillard, 2013).  
The increased focus on fraud investigations requires a unique set of investigative 
skills due to the unique challenges fraud investigations present. These challenges include 
the ability to manage more time-intensive investigations when compared to other types of 
criminal investigations. On average, AFOSI PF cases took approximately twice as long to 
close when compared to death investigations and 10 times longer to case closure than the 
average narcotics investigation (“AFOSI CY Wrap Up,” 2013). Additionally, significant 
prosecutorial differences exist between criminal and fraud investigations because almost 
all criminal cases are handled through Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
proceedings, whereas major procurement fraud investigations are handled at the civilian 
federal district court level. Sufficiently addressing these challenges weighs heavily on the 
proper training of personnel. The following section discusses the AFOSI training and 
credentialing requirements. 
C. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS TRAINING AND 
CREDENTIALING 
All AFOSI special agents must complete three stages of required training to be 
considered fully qualified. The first stage of the training process begins when individuals 
selected for a special agent position arrive at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia (GA). FLETC provides federal law enforcement 
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training to over 90 different federal agencies ranging from the U.S. Secret Service 
(USSS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to Military 
Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIO) such as the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS) and AFOSI (FLETC, n.d.). The FLETC Criminal Investigator Training 
Program (CITP) is the first course required of all federal agents who specialize in 
criminal investigations. The CITP is an 11-week program that provides basic training on 
a number of fundamental skills and principles required for criminal investigations, such 
as interviewing, interrogations, surveillance, and crime scene processing (FLETC, n.d.). 
The training includes both classroom instruction as well as scenario-based training, which 
provides an opportunity for practical application of learned skills and concepts, to include 
fraud-specific investigations. 
Upon graduation from CITP, many organizations, including the AFOSI, require 
that special agent trainees attend additional agency-specific training. The U.S. Air Force 
Special Investigations Academy (USAFSIA) provides AFOSI special agents with 
agency-specific training through the Basic Special Investigations Course (BSIC), also 
located on the FLETC installation. BSIC, the second stage of AFOSI special agent 
training, is an eight-week training program that builds on the knowledge and skills 
learned during CITP and focuses on concepts specific to military investigations, such as 
jurisdictional responsibilities, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and 
counterintelligence activities (AFOSI, n.d.). AFOSI special agents who successfully 
complete both the CITP and BSIC programs receive their special agent badge and 
credentials and are subsequently assigned to one of 221 AFOSI operating locations 
around the world (AFOSI, 2012). 
The third, and longest, stage of required initial training begins as special agents 
arrive at their initial AFOSI office. Although special agents have received almost five 
months of intensive instruction through CITP and BSIC, the concepts and skills provided 
during that time only provide a basic foundation of knowledge required to conduct 
criminal investigations. To build on this foundation, all AFOSI special agents must 
complete a 15-month Probationary Agent Training Program (PATP) (AFOSI, 2012). The 
PATP provides new special agents with additional knowledge-based training through the 
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Basic Extension Program (BEP) and application-based training through on-the-job-
training (OJT) experience. While special agents gain valuable experience through OJT, 
BEP is the only element of PATP that contains defined knowledge competencies. 
Therefore, this research project will solely focus on the BEP portion of PATP. 
The BEP is a 26-week online distance learning program that encompasses a wide 
range of knowledge competencies required for criminal investigations (AFOSI, 2012). 
The BEP is broken down into four primary distance learning blocks of instruction. Each 
block requires special agents to complete and submit a series of knowledge-based 
practical exercises. Of the four blocks, the fourth and final block, Economic Crimes (EC), 
addresses knowledge competencies required for fraud investigations. The AFOSI (2012) 
agent training manual describes the EC block as “an approximately 4-week course 
focusing on liaison, fraud concepts/definitions, unit-level fraud programs, and fraud 
investigations with real world application in target analysis” (para. 2.8.2.2.4). 
Within the AFOSI community, credentialing is the term used to identify the 
culmination of the three-stage training process. AFOSI special agent credentials serve as 
the official means of identification for special agents and consist of a photo identification 
and description of applicable statutes that provide the special agent with the authority to 
conduct official duties. Although AFOSI special agents receive their badge and 
credentials upon graduation from BSIC in order to conduct official duties during their 
probationary period, probationary special agents are not considered fully credentialed 
until they have completed the entire PATP.  
D. POLICIES AND REGULATIONS DETERMINING AFOSI 
COMPETENCIES 
As an MCIO, the AFOSI must adhere to DOD and USAF policies and regulations 
as they pertain to administering approved training programs. DOD Directive (DODD) 
1322.18, Military Training, outlines policies and responsibilities for executing and 
maintaining training programs for all active duty military and civilian personnel (DOD, 
2009). Subsequently, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2201, Air Force Training Program, 
implemented DODD 1322.18 policy in the creation and maintenance of training 
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programs and procedures for the USAF (Department of the Air Force, 2013). AFI 36-
2201 includes the identification and establishment of training requirements, hereafter 
referred to as knowledge competencies (Department of the Air Force, 2013). 
AFI 36-2201 requires all USAF career fields, including AFOSI special agents, to 
establish a Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP). Paragraph 5.7.1, AFI 36-
2201 describes the CFETP as “the primary document used to identify life-cycle education 
and training requirements. It serves as a road map for career progression and outlines 
requirements that must be satisfied at appropriate points throughout the career path” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2013, p. 35). Each career field CFETP provides an 
itemized list of knowledge competencies, both mandatory core tasks and non-mandatory 
tasks. This itemized list is referred to as the Specialty Training Standard (STS). 
The STS can be considered a living document, as it is revised to reflect changes in 
technology and the operating environment of each career field. The establishment of 
required knowledge competencies found within the STS, as well as changes to those 
competencies, are made during utilization and training workshops (U&TW). U&TWs are 
comprised of career field managers and subject matter experts (SME) who are best suited 
to provide real-time input pertaining to knowledge competencies required to meet the 
needs of the field. The AFOSI Special Investigations CFETP provides a detailed listing 
of all knowledge competencies required for both active-duty military and civilian special 
agents (AFOSI, 2012).  
Each knowledge competency listed in the STS must also be measurable in terms 
of the extent of knowledge required for each competency. All USAF CFETP STS use a 
standardized scale to determine the proficiency level required for each competency. The 
scale uses letter designators A through D to identify the required proficiency level.  
Section 24 of the AFOSI CFETP STS covers economic and environmental crimes—
fraud—and requires credentialed special agents to obtain a proficiency of either A, B or 
C, dependent upon the competency and corresponding stage of training (CITP, BSIC or 
BEP) (AFOSI, 2012). Table 1 provides the standardized knowledge definitions and 
applicable proficiency codes. 
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A Can identify basic facts and terms about the subject. 
(FACTS) 
B Can identify relationship of basic facts and state general 
principles about the subject. (PRINCIPLES) 
C Can analyze facts and principles and draw conclusions 
about the subject. (ANALYSIS) 
D Can evaluate conditions and make proper decisions about 
the subject. (EVALUATION) 
 
In addition to identifying a list of knowledge competencies, the STS emphasizes 
certain competencies if that competency “makes a disproportionate contribution to the 
success of providing the right skills needed for military operations, anywhere, anytime. 
[The competency] cannot be duplicated by any other organization and is critical for the 
future” (AFOSI, 2012, p. 16). These competencies are referred to as core tasks.  For the 
purposes of this research, all AFOSI competencies presented are considered to be core 
tasks because they are required to complete at least one stage of AFOSI special agent 
training. The following section will serve to identify the fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies, hereafter referred to as knowledge competencies, found throughout the 
three stages of AFOSI special agent training.  
E. DETERMINING AFOSI FRAUD INVESTIGATION KNOWLEDGE 
COMPETENCIES 
Special agents responsible for completing CITP, BSIC, and BEP are required to 
demonstrate all knowledge competencies learned through a series of exams administered 
at the end of each block or course throughout the three-stage training process. The exams 
serve as a means of measuring the special agent’s understanding of each knowledge 
competency. 
Fraud investigation knowledge competencies required to successfully complete 
CITP consist of the following: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
reporting; a basic identification and knowledge of Title 18 U.S. Code § 1956 and 1957 
(Laundering of Money Instruments and Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property 
Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity); financial profiling methods; and the basic 
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identification and knowledge of the elements of wire fraud, mail fraud, and transportation 
across interstate lines. The knowledge competency, FinCEN reporting, includes the basic 
identification and knowledge of currency transaction reports (CTRs), currency and 
money instrument reports (CMIRs), foreign bank and financial accounts reports 
(FBARs), and suspicious activity reports (SARs). These reports, filed by financial 
institutions to identify high-dollar or suspicious transactions, are often crucial pieces of 
information used to build money laundering and structuring investigations (Kittay, 2011). 
Money laundering investigations focus on the various methods individuals use to conceal 
proceeds earned from criminal activity in an effort to make those proceeds appear as if 
they originated from a legitimate source (Levi & Reuter, 2006).  
Fraud investigation knowledge competencies required to successfully complete 
BSIC consist of the following: familiarization with the AFOSI fraud mission; having a 
basic understanding of terms and concepts pertaining to environmental crimes; criminal, 
civil, contractual, and administrative aspects of the Remedies Program; a basic 
knowledge of fraud statutes; a basic knowledge of the government procurement process; 
and a basic knowledge of various fraud schemes.  Environmental crimes primarily 
include the illegal dumping of harmful materials in an effort to reduce the high costs 
typically associated with legitimate disposal processes (Cohen, Gibbs, Rorie, Simpson & 
Slocum, 2013). The fraud schemes covered during BSIC include product substitution, 
cost mischarging, defective pricing, and public corruption. These fraud schemes are 
emphasized throughout BSIC because they are all commonly found fraud schemes 
throughout the procurement process (Lander et al., 2008). 
Fraud investigation knowledge competencies required to successfully complete 
PATP and BEP include: having a basic knowledge of the purpose behind the fraud 
working group and target development cycle; determining prosecutorial jurisdiction for 
fraud investigations; requesting subpoenas; developing the fraud investigative plan; 
conducting contract reviews; and having a basic understanding of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA).  The knowledge competency 
that covers fraud working groups and target development cycles addresses the use and 
benefit of professional working groups that combine expertise and experience to better 
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detect and deter fraudulent activity (Carpenter, 2007). For an itemized list of knowledge 
competencies required for completion of each stage of AFOSI special agent training, 
refer to the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model in Appendix D. 
F. SUMMARY 
Chapter III provided a historical background of AFOSI from the organization’s 
inception to its current operational focuses. Additionally, this chapter identified the three 
stages of training all AFOSI special agents must complete and defined the meaning and 
purpose of the credentialing process. Finally, this chapter outlined the DOD’s, and 
subsequently the AFOSI’s, process for developing knowledge competencies, concluding 
with an identification of all fraud knowledge competencies required for special agents to 
be considered fully credentialed. Chapter IV consists of a comparative analysis of fraud 
investigation knowledge competencies required by both the ACFE and AFOSI. 
 30 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 31 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV provides a comparative analysis of the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE) and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) fraud 
investigation competencies. The chapter first provides an overview of the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model and the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model. The 
chapter then discusses the methodology used for conducting the analysis, including an 
explanation of how the various competencies were determined to be gaps or overlaps 
with one another. The chapter then identifies and discusses the overlaps between the two 
knowledge competency models. The chapter finishes with the identification and 
discussion of the gaps between the two fraud knowledge competency models.  
B. ACFE KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCY MODEL OVERVIEW 
The ACFE fraud knowledge competency model was created for the purposes of 
this research project to identify all knowledge competencies within the ACFE body of 
knowledge.  The ACFE fraud knowledge competency model was designed to mirror the 
organization of the Fraud Examiners Manual. The main sections of the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model reflect the four primary volumes that comprise the Fraud 
Examiners Manual. Additionally, each section contains three to four subsections that 
further separate the volumes into similar subject matter. The primary sections include 
Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes, Law, Investigation, and Fraud Prevention & 
Deterrence, and some of the corresponding subsections include such topics as 
Occupational Fraud Schemes, Punishing Offenders, Analyzing Evidence, and Fraud 





Table 2.   ACFE Fraud Knowledge Competency Model Section Breakdown 
ACFE FRAUD KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCY MODEL SECTION 
BREAKDOWN 
Section 1 Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes 
Subsection 1.1 Financial Transactions 
Subsection 1.2 Occupational Fraud Schemes 
Subsection 1.3 Other Fraud Schemes 
Section 2 Law 
Subsection 2.1 Overview 
Subsection 2.2 Punishing Offenders 
Subsection 2.3 Practice & Procedure 
Section 3 Investigation 
Subsection 3.1 Investigation Procedures 
Subsection 3.2 Interviewing 
Subsection 3.3 Gathering Information 
Subsection 3.4 Analyzing Evidence 
Section 4 Fraud Prevention & Deterrence 
Subsection 4.1 Understanding Crime 
Subsection 4.2 Fraud Prevention 
Subsection 4.3 Ethics & Responsibilities 
 
The ACFE does not officially refer to the Fraud Examiners Manual as its body of 
knowledge, nor does it consider the subsections found within the manual as knowledge 
competencies; however, for the purposes of this research, the ACFE knowledge 
competencies were identified as all testable subsections within the four volumes.  The 
term testable refers to subsections in which possible questions used to create the Certified 
Fraud Examiner (CFE) certification exam are derived.  In total, the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model contains 45 competencies.  
The AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model was also created and consists of 
three primary sections reflecting the three stages of training special agents complete to 
become fully credentialed: Criminal Investigators Training Program (CITP), Basic 
Special Investigations Course (BSIC), and Basic Extension Program (BEP). For purposes 
of this research, the knowledge competencies comprise all testable learning objectives 
presented during the three stages of training. In total, the AFOSI fraud knowledge 
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competency model contains 41 competencies.  Table 3 provides a breakdown of the 
AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model by section. 
Table 3.   AFOSI Fraud Knowledge Competency Model Section Breakdown 
AFOSI FRAUD KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCIES 
Competency 
Designator 
Task, Knowledge and Technical Reference Core 
Task 
STAGE 1 – CITP 
1.1 – 1.4                                           CITP 
STAGE 2 – BSIC 
2.1 – 2.3                        Economic Crime Orientation 
2.4 – 2.6                              Environmental Crimes 
2.7 – 2.10                                   Fraud Remedies 
2.11 – 2.14                                    Fraud Statutes 
2.15 – 2.19                       Procurement Process Overview 
2.20 – 2.25                                    Fraud Schemes 
2.26 – 2.27                          Economic Crimes Resources 
STAGE 3 – PATP/BEP 
3.1 – 3.2                           Economic Crimes DL 101 
3.3 – 3.6                           Economic Crimes DL 102 
3.7 – 3.9                           Economic Crimes DL 103 
3.10                           Economic Crimes DL 104 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for the comparative analysis consisted of a review of each 
fraud investigation knowledge competency, hereafter referred to as knowledge 
competencies, to determine its content. ACFE and AFOSI knowledge competency 
content was determined through reviewing the applicable Fraud Examiners Manual 
subsection or AFOSI training performance objectives.  Once the content of each 
knowledge competency was identified, a direct comparison of the ACFE and AFOSI 
models was conducted to identify which content was included in the knowledge 
competency models. The ACFE fraud knowledge competency model was used as the 
base model because it was identified as the professional standard body of knowledge for 
the purpose of this research. Therefore, the comparative analysis process consisted of 
laying out each volume and subsection of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model, 
 34 
followed by identifying any AFOSI knowledge competencies that contained either 
similar or dissimilar content. Competencies consisting of content found under both 
knowledge competency models were identified as overlaps. Competencies consisting of 
content found only under one knowledge competency model were identified as gaps. 
The comparative analysis also identified knowledge competencies within the 
ACFE fraud knowledge competency model that contained content applicable to all 
criminal investigations, such as interviewing techniques, evidence collection, and report 
writing. These knowledge competencies were referred to as non-fraud knowledge 
competencies. The AFOSI knowledge competency literature review conducted in support 
of this research project focused solely on fraud-related knowledge competencies; 
however, special agents receive significant additional training during CITP, BSIC, and 
BEP that also covers the non-fraud related knowledge competencies found in the ACFE 
fraud knowledge competency model. Therefore, these competencies were treated as 
overlaps between the two knowledge competency models. In the following comparative 
analysis, when an AFOSI non-fraud related knowledge competency overlaps with an 
ACFE knowledge competency, the corresponding AFOSI stage of training (CITP, BSIC, 
BEP) is listed as the overlapping AFOSI knowledge competency. 
D. ACFE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The following comparative analysis is broken down by ACFE knowledge 
competency section and subsection. A corresponding summary of findings for each 
ACFE knowledge competency can be found after each table. 
1. Financial Transactions and Fraud Schemes 
a. Financial Transactions 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 1 (Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes), 
subsection 1.1 (Financial Transactions) identified that Accounting Concepts (1.1.1) was 
the only knowledge competency listed under subsection 1.1. The AFOSI fraud 
knowledge competency model did not have any knowledge competency that was 
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considered comparable to the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model, as referenced 
in Table 4.  The section following Table 4 discusses the findings. 
Table 4.   ACFE Subsection 1.1 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge 
Competency 
AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
1. Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes 
1.1. Financial Transactions 
1.1.1. Accounting Concepts None Identified Gap 
 
(1) FINDING 1-1: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Accounting Concepts 
(1.1.1)—Gap  
This ACFE knowledge competency consisted of basic financial accounting 
terminology and theory generally taught at academic institutions such as the accounting 
cycle and the use of T–accounts. Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI 
knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap.  
b. Occupational Fraud Schemes 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 1 (Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes), 
subsection 1.2 (Occupational Fraud Schemes) identified the following: There were a total 
of six ACFE knowledge competencies listed under subsection 1.2. Three ACFE 
knowledge competencies, Asset Misappropriation (1.2.2), Cash Receipts (1.2.3), and 
Bribery & Corruption (1.2.6), were found to have overlapping AFOSI knowledge 
competencies. Specifically, AFOSI knowledge competency Fraud Schemes and Statutes 
(3.5) contained comparable content to both ACFE knowledge competencies Asset 
Misappropriation (1.2.2) and Cash Receipts (1.2.3). Non-fraud related AFOSI knowledge 
competencies provided during CITP, BSIC and BEP contained comparable content to 
ACFE knowledge competency Inventory/Other Assets. AFOSI knowledge competency 
Public Corruption Schemes (2.23) contained comparable content to ACFE knowledge 
competency Bribery & Corruption (1.2.6). The remaining two ACFE knowledge 
competencies, Financial Statement Fraud (1.2.1) and Fraudulent Disbursements (1.2.4) 
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were identified as gaps due to a lack of comparable AFOSI knowledge competencies 
within the AFOSI body of knowledge. Table 5 provides a list of all knowledge 
competency gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 1.2 of the ACFE fraud knowledge 
competency model.  The section following Table 5 discusses the findings. 
Table 5.   ACFE Subsection 1.2 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
1. Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes 
1.2. Occupational Fraud Schemes 
1.2.1. Financial Statement Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.2.2. Asset Misappropriation 3.5. Fraud Schemes and Statutes Overlap 
1.2.3. Cash Receipts 3.5. Fraud Schemes and Statutes Overlap 
1.2.4. Fraudulent Disbursements None Identified Gap 
1.2.5. Inventory/Other Assets Non-Fraud Related CITP, BSIC& 
BEP Knowledge Competencies 
Overlap 
1.2.6. Bribery & Corruption 2.23. Public Corruption Schemes Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 1-2: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Financial Statement Fraud 
(1.2.1)—Gap  
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes dealing with 
the misrepresentation of a public or private enterprise’s financial standing, to include a 
discussion of pertinent statutes and regulations set in place to hold companies and their 
executives accountable, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Similar content was not 
identified under any AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be a gap.  
(2) FINDING 1-3: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Asset Misappropriation 
(1.2.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes used to 
conceal theft of organizational assets and larceny. AFOSI knowledge competency Fraud 
Schemes and Statutes (3.5) also covers theft and larceny. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be an overlap. 
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(3) FINDING 1-4: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Cash Receipts (1.2.3)—
Overlap  
This ACFE knowledge competency identifies schemes involving either 
embezzlement or skimming of cash receipts. AFOSI knowledge competency Fraud 
Schemes and Statutes (3.5) also covers embezzlement and other cash diversion schemes. 
Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(4) FINDING 1-5: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Fraudulent Disbursements 
(1.2.4)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of corporate fraud schemes involving 
falsified cash and check transactions between companies, to include the use of “shell 
companies” to hide ill-gotten corporate funds. Similar content was not identified under 
any AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered 
to be a gap. 
(5) FINDING 1-6: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Inventory/Other Assets 
(1.2.5)—Overlap.  
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes involving the 
misuse or theft of company property and assets.  Non-fraud related AFOSI knowledge 
competencies consisting of similar content such as larceny and theft of government 
property are provided during CITP, BSIC and BEP. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(6) FINDING 1-7: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Bribery & Corruption 
(1.2.6)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes involving the 
misuse of authority associated with an official position to obtain some sort of unfair 
advantage. AFOSI knowledge competency Public Corruption Schemes (2.23) covers 
similar subject matter. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an 
overlap. 
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c. Other Fraud Schemes 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 1 (Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes), 
subsection 1.3 (Other Fraud Schemes) identified the following: This subsection covers 
fraudulent schemes affecting various types of industry such as financial, health care, and 
insurance; therefore, the organization of subsection 1.3 was based on the respective 
affected industry. There were a total of eight ACFE knowledge competencies listed under 
subsection 1.3. One ACFE knowledge competency, Contract Procurement Fraud (1.3.8), 
overlapped with identified AFOSI knowledge competencies. Specifically, AFOSI 
knowledge competencies Phases of the Acquisitions Cycle (2.15), Legally Binding 
Contracts (2.16), Contract Types (2.17), Contract Requirements/Specifications (2.18), 
Product Substitution (2.22), Cost Mischarging/Defective Pricing (2.24), Fraud Indicators 
(2.25) and Fraud Schemes and Statutes (3.5) contained comparable content to ACFE 
knowledge competency Contract Procurement Fraud (1.3.8). The remaining seven ACFE 
knowledge competencies, Financial Institution Fraud (1.3.1), Check/Credit Card Fraud 
(1.3.2), Theft of Intellectual Property (1.3.3), Insurance Fraud (1.3.4), Health Care Fraud 
(1.3.5), Consumer Fraud (1.3.6), and Computer/Internet Fraud (1.3.7) were identified as 
gaps due to a lack of comparable AFOSI knowledge competencies within the AFOSI 
knowledge competency model. Table 6 provides a listing of all knowledge competency 
gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 1.3 of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency 
model.  The section following Table 6 discusses the findings. 
Table 6.   ACFE Subsection 1.3 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge 
Competency 
AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
1. Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes 
1.3. Other Fraud Schemes 
1.3.1. Financial Institution 
Fraud 
None Identified Gap 
1.3.2. Check/Credit Card Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.3. Theft of Intellectual 
Property 
None Identified Gap 
1.3.4. Insurance Fraud None Identified Gap 
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1.3.5. Health Care Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.6. Consumer Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.7. Computer/Internet Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.8. Contract Procurement 
Fraud 
2.15. Phases of the Acquisitions 
Cycle, 2.16. Legally Binding 
Contracts, 2.17. Contract Types, 
2.18. Contract 
Requirements/Specifications, 2.22. 
Product Substitution, 2.24. Cost 
Mischarging/Defective Pricing, 2.25. 
Fraud Indicators & 3.5. Fraud 
Schemes and Statutes 
Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 1-8: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Financial Institution Fraud 
(1.3.1)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes affecting 
federally insured repositories such as banks and credit unions. Similar content was not 
identified under any AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be a gap. 
(2) FINDING 1-9: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Check/Credit Card Fraud 
(1.3.2)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of the practice of counterfeiting 
checks and credit cards, as well as the various schemes employed to use the counterfeit 
items for personal gain. Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI knowledge 
competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap. 
(3) FINDING 1-10:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Theft of Intellectual 
Property (1.3.3)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of corporate espionage and other 
threats to industry trade secrets. Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI 
knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap. 
(4) FINDING 1-11:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Insurance Fraud 
(1.3.4)—Gap 
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This ACFE knowledge competency consists of both internal and external 
fraudulent schemes. Internal schemes involve fraudulent employee activity such as 
intentionally misdirected settlement checks and insurance premium embezzlement. 
External schemes involve fraudulent activity on the part of the insurance policy 
holder/customer such as filing false claims of loss in an effort to collect insurance 
reimbursements. Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI knowledge 
competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap. 
(5) FINDING 1-12:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Health Care Fraud 
(1.3.5)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes committed 
primarily on the part of the health care provider. Common schemes involve health care 
providers submitting false invoices for payment or offering a kickback to third parties 
who purchased unnecessary health care goods or services from the health care provider. 
Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, 
this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap. 
(6) FINDING 1-13:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Consumer Fraud 
(1.3.6)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of fraudulent schemes directed solely 
towards consumers in an attempt to get them to purchase goods or services under some 
false pretense. Consumer fraud schemes include a wide variety of confidence scams 
ranging from substandard household repairs to falsely advertising that the proceeds of a 
sale would go to a specific beneficiary. Similar content was not identified under any 
AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to 
be a gap. 
(7) FINDING 1-14:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Computer Internet Fraud 
(1.3.7)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency covers fraudulent schemes where the use of a 
computer was a necessary tool to successfully complete the scheme. Common computer 
fraud schemes include false representation over electronic communication, such as 
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criminals posing as a victim’s bank in an effort to get the victim to provide passwords 
and other sensitive account data or the use of malware or computer viruses to siphon 
sensitive data from a victim’s computer. Similar content was not identified under any 
AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to 
be a gap. 
(8) FINDING 1-15:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Contract Procurement 
Fraud (1.3.8)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency covers fraudulent activity within a public or 
private procurement system contract. Procurement systems pertain to any established set 
of standards and procedures used to purchase goods and services. The ACFE knowledge 
competency also provides a brief overview of common terms and methods of 
procurement. Common schemes include bid rotation, collusion, product substitution and 
defective pricing. AFOSI knowledge competencies Phases of the Acquisitions Cycle 
(2.15), Legally Binding Contracts (2.16), Contract Types (2.17), Contract 
Requirements/Specifications (2.18), Product Substitution (2.22), Mischarging/Defective 
Pricing Schemes (2.24), Fraud Indicators (2.25) and Fraud Schemes and Statutes (3.5) 




A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 2 (Law), subsection 2.1 (Overview) identified the 
following: There were a total of six ACFE knowledge competencies listed under 
subsection 2.1. Three ACFE knowledge competencies, Overview of the U.S. Legal 
System (2.1.1), The Law Related to Fraud (2.1.2) and Money Laundering (2.1.5), were 
found to have overlapping AFOSI knowledge competencies. Specifically, non-fraud 
specific AFOSI knowledge competencies covered during CITP and BEP contain 
comparable content to ACFE knowledge competency Overview of the U.S. Legal System 
(2.1.1). AFOSI knowledge competencies Elements of Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud, and 
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Transportation Across Interstate Lines (1.4), Administrative Aspects of the Remedies 
Program (2.9), Fraud Criminal Statutes (2.11), Fraud Civil Statutes (2.12), Issues 
Relevant to Proving Intent in Fraud Investigations (2.14), Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in 
Fraud Investigations (3.3), and Federal Acquisition Regulation (3.8) contained 
comparable content to ACFE knowledge competency The Law Related to Fraud (2.1.2). 
AFOSI knowledge competency Title 18 U.S.C. 1956/1957 (Money Laundering) (1.2) 
contained comparable content to ACFE knowledge competency Money Laundering 
(2.1.5). The remaining three ACFE knowledge competencies, Bankruptcy Fraud (2.1.3), 
Securities Fraud (2.1.4), and Tax Fraud (2.1.6), were identified as gaps due to a lack of 
comparable AFOSI knowledge competencies within the AFOSI knowledge competency 
model. Table 7 provides a list of all of the knowledge competency gaps and overlaps 
identified in subsection 2.1 of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model. The 
section following Table 7 discusses the findings. 
Table 7.   ACFE Subsection 2.1 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge 
Competency 
AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
2. Law 
2.1. Overview 
2.1.1. Overview of the U.S. 
Legal System 
Non-Fraud Related CITP& BEP 
Knowledge Competencies 
Overlap 
2.1.2. The Law Related to Fraud 1.4. Elements of Wire Fraud, Mail 
Fraud and Transportation Across 
Interstate Lines, 2.9. Administrative 
Aspects of the Remedies Program, 
2.11. Fraud Criminal Statutes, 2.12. 
Fraud Civil Statutes, 2.14. Issues 
Relevant to Proving Intent in Fraud 
Investigations, 3.3. Prosecutorial 
Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations, 
3.8. Federal Acquisition Regulation  
Overlap 
2.1.3. Bankruptcy Fraud None Identified Gap 
2.1.4. Securities Fraud None Identified Gap 
2.1.5. Money Laundering 1.2. Title 18 U.S.C. 1956/1957 
(Money Laundering) 
Overlap 
2.1.6. Tax Fraud None Identified Gap 
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(1) FINDING 2-1: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Overview of the U.S. 
Legal System (2.1.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides an overview of the U.S. legal 
system. Specific areas of focus include basic concepts of law, the judicial system, and 
both civil and criminal proceedings as they pertain to fraudulent activity. Non-fraud 
related AFOSI knowledge competencies consisting of similar content are provided during 
CITP. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 2-2: ACFE Knowledge Competency: The Law Related to Fraud 
(2.1.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides an overview of the terminology and 
federal statutes used to define and regulate fraudulent activity. AFOSI knowledge 
competencies Elements of Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud, and Transportation Across Interstate 
Lines (1.4), Administrative Aspects of the Remedies Program (2.9), Fraud Criminal 
Statutes (2.11), Fraud Civil Statutes (2.12), Issues Relevant to Proving Intent in Fraud 
Investigations (2.14), Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations (3.3) and Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (3.8) covers similar subject matter. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(3) FINDING 2-3: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Bankruptcy Fraud 
(2.1.3)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of an overview of the laws that 
regulate filing for bankruptcy, as well as common fraudulent schemes employed to gain 
an unfair advantage during bankruptcy proceedings. Similar content was not identified 
under any AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is 
considered to be a gap.  
(4) FINDING 2-4: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Securities Fraud (2.1.4)—
Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of an overview of the laws that 
regulate the purchase, holding, and sale of securities, such as stocks and bonds, as well as 
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common fraudulent schemes employed to gain an unfair advantage in the securities trade. 
Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI knowledge competency. Therefore, 
this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap. 
(5) FINDING 2-5: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Money Laundering 
(2.1.5)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency defines money laundering, provides an 
overview of common money laundering practices, and lists applicable laws and acts 
established to prevent and punish the act of money laundering. AFOSI knowledge 
competency Title 18 U.S.C. 1956/1957 (Money Laundering) (1.4) covers similar subject 
matter. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(6) FINDING 2-6: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Tax Fraud (2.1.6)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency defines tax fraud, provides an overview of 
common tax fraud practices, and lists applicable laws and acts established to prevent and 
punish tax fraud. Similar content was not identified under any AFOSI knowledge 
competency. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be a gap. 
b. Punishing Offenders 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 2 (Law), subsection 2.2 (Punishing Offenders) 
identified the following: There were a total of two ACFE knowledge competencies listed 
under subsection 2.2. Both ACFE knowledge competencies, Criminal Prosecutions for 
Fraud (2.2.1) and Civil Justice System (2.2.2), were found to have overlapping AFOSI 
knowledge competencies. Specifically, AFOSI knowledge competencies Criminal 
Aspects of the Remedies Program (2.7) and Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud 
Investigations (3.3) contained comparable content to ACFE knowledge competency 
Criminal Prosecutions for Fraud (2.2.1). AFOSI knowledge competencies Civil Aspects 
of the Remedies Program (2.8) and Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations 
(3.3) contained comparable content to ACFE knowledge competency Civil Justice 
System (2.2.2). Table 8 provides a listing of all knowledge competency gaps and overlaps 
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identified in subsection 2.2 of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model. The 
section following Table 8 discusses the findings. 
Table 8.   ACFE Subsection 2.2 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge 
Competency 
AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
2. Law 
2.2. Punishing Offenders 
2.2.1. Criminal Prosecutions for 
Fraud 
2.7. Criminal Aspects of the 
Remedies Program, 3.3. 
Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud 
Investigations 
Overlap 
2.2.2. Civil Justice System 2.8. Civil Aspects of the Remedies 
Program, 3.3. Prosecutorial 
Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations 
Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 2-7: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Criminal Prosecutions for 
Fraud (2.2.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides an overview of the basic principles 
of criminal law, to include applicable constitutional rights and the difference between 
criminal and civil law. AFOSI knowledge competencies Criminal Aspects of the 
Remedies Program (2.7) and Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations (3.3) 
contained comparable content. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be 
an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 2-8: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Civil Justice System 
(2.2.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides an overview of the basic principles 
of civil law, legal actions brought forth by private parties, as well as the federal rules and 
procedures that provide guidance for civil actions. AFOSI knowledge competencies Civil 
Aspects of the Remedies Program (2.8) and Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud 
Investigations (3.3) contained comparable content. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be an overlap. 
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c. Practice and Procedure 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 2 (Law), subsection 2.3 (Practice & Procedure) 
identified the following: There were a total of three ACFE knowledge competencies 
listed under subsection 2.3. All three ACFE knowledge competencies Individual Rights 
During Examination (2.3.1), Basic Principles of Evidence (2.3.2) and Testifying as an 
Expert Witness (2.3.4) were found to have overlapping AFOSI knowledge competencies. 
Specifically, non-fraud specific AFOSI knowledge competencies covered during CITP, 
BSIC, and BEP contain comparable content to ACFE knowledge competencies 
Individual Rights During Examination (2.3.1), Basic Principles of Evidence (2.3.2) and 
Testifying as an Expert Witness (2.3.3). Table 9 provides a listing of all knowledge 
competency gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 2.3 of the ACFE fraud knowledge 
competency model.  The section following Table 9 discusses the findings. 
Table 9.   ACFE Subsection 2.3 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge 
Competency 
AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
2. Law 
2.3. Practice & Procedure 
2.3.1. Individual Rights During 
Examination 
Non-Fraud Related CITP, BSIC& 
BEP Knowledge Competencies 
Overlap 
2.3.2. Basic Principles of 
Evidence 
Non-Fraud Related CITP, BSIC& 
BEP Knowledge Competencies 
Overlap 
2.3.3. Testifying as an Expert 
Witness 
Non-Fraud Related CITP, BSIC& 
BEP Knowledge Competencies 
Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 2-9: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Individual Rights During 
Examination (2.3.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides an overview of the U.S. legal 
system. Specific areas of focus include basic concepts of law, the judicial system, and 




related AFOSI knowledge competencies consisting of similar content are provided during 
CITP, BSIC, and BEP. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an 
overlap. 
(2) FINDING 2-10:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Basic Principles of 
Evidence (2.3.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency discusses the basic principles of evidence as 
they pertain to legal proceedings. Specific areas of focus include the role evidence plays 
in the justice system, basic forms of evidence, the federal rules of evidence (FRE) and 
special circumstances regarding evidence submission and omission. Non-fraud related 
AFOSI knowledge competencies consisting of similar content are covered during CITP, 
BSIC, and BEP. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap.  
(3) FINDING 2-11:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Testifying as an Expert 
Witness (2.3.3)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency discusses the practice of testifying in criminal 
or civil legal proceedings, defines the role of testifying subject matter experts, and covers 
additional factors to consider such as conflicts of interest, trial preparation, and disclosure 
requirements. Non-fraud related AFOSI knowledge competencies consisting of similar 
content are covered during CITP, BSIC, and BEP. Therefore, this knowledge competency 
is considered to be an overlap. 
3. Investigation 
a. Investigative Procedures 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 3 (Investigation), subsection 3.1 (Investigative 
Procedures) identified the following: There were a total of two ACFE knowledge 
competencies listed under subsection 3.1. The ACFE knowledge competency Planning 
and Conducting a Fraud Examination (3.1.1) was found to have an overlapping AFOSI 
knowledge competency How to Create a Fraud Investigative Plan (3.4). The ACFE 
knowledge competency Report Writing (3.1.2) also had overlapping content with AFOSI 
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knowledge competencies. However, report writing in AFOSI is not fraud specific. The 
same principles of report writing are applied to all types of investigations. As a result, 
there is not an AFOSI fraud specific competency with which to compare the ACFE 
knowledge competency Report Writing (3.1.2). However, it was still determined that 
there is an overlap between the ACFE knowledge competency of Report Writing (3.1.2) 
and non-fraud related knowledge competencies covered during CITP, BSIC, and BEP. 
Table 10 provides a listing of all knowledge competency gaps and overlaps identified in 
subsection 3.1 of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model. The section following 
Table 10 discusses the findings. 
Table 10.   ACFE Subsection 3.1 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
3. Investigation 
3.1. Investigation Procedures 
3.1.1. Planning & Conducting a 
 Fraud Examination 
3.4 - How to Create a Fraud 
 Investigative Plan 
Overlap 
3.1.2. Report Writing BSIC Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 3-1: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Planning and Conducting 
a Fraud Examination (3.1.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a discussion on the importance of 
conducting fraud examinations, as well as guidance on how to create a plan for 
responding to allegations of fraud. This competency also covers what steps to include in a 
fraud examination. Similar content was identified under AFOSI knowledge competency 
How to Create a Fraud Investigative Plan (3.4). Therefore, this knowledge competency is 
considered to be an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 3-2: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Report Writing (3.1.2)—
Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of instructions for preparing a good 
report subsequent to a fraud examination. This competency includes guidance on format,  
style, structure, and mistakes to avoid. Although not specific to fraud training, similar 
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content was covered during AFOSI BSIC training. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be an overlap. 
b. Interviewing 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 3 (Investigation), subsection 3.2 (Interviewing) 
identified the following: There were a total of two ACFE knowledge competencies listed 
under subsection 3.2. These ACFE knowledge competencies were Interview Theory and 
Application (3.2.1) and Interviewing Suspects and Signed Statements (3.2.2). Both 
competencies had overlapping content with AFOSI knowledge competencies. However, 
interviewing in AFOSI is not fraud specific. The same principles of interviewing are 
applied to all types of investigations. As a result, there is not an AFOSI fraud specific 
competency with which to compare these ACFE knowledge competencies. However, it 
was still determined that there is an overlap between these ACFE knowledge 
competencies and non-fraud related AFOSI knowledge competencies covered during 
CITP, BSIC, and BEP. Table 11 provides a listing of all knowledge competency gaps and 
overlaps identified in subsection 3.2 of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model. 
The section following Table 11 discusses the findings. 
Table 11.   ACFE Subsection 3.2 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
3. Investigation 
3.2. Interviewing 
3.2.1. Interview Theory & 
 Application 
CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.2.2. Interviewing Suspects & 
 Signed Statements 
CITP/BSIC Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 3-3: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Interview Theory and 
Application (3.2.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of guidance on how to prepare for 
and conduct a successful interview. This competency also provides instruction on 
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different interviewing techniques as well as the various types of questions one can ask to 
elicit responses from an interviewee. Though not specific to fraud training, similar 
content was covered during CITP and AFOSI BSIC training. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 3-4: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Interviewing Suspects and 
Signed Statements (3.2.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides more in depth instruction on 
conducting interrogations. This includes recommendations on how to organize the 
interview room, what types of questions to ask, and methods for eliciting an admission 
and subsequent confession from a suspect. This competency also discusses important 
elements that should be included in a suspect’s statement. Similar content was identified 
under non-fraud specific AFSOI knowledge competencies covered during CITP and 
BSIC training. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
c. Gathering Information 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 3 (Investigation), subsection 3.3 (Gathering 
Information) identified the following: There were a total of three ACFE knowledge 
competencies listed under subsection 3.3. These competencies are Covert Examinations 
(3.3.1), Sources of Information (3.3.2), and Tracing Illicit Transactions (3.3.3). The 
ACFE knowledge competencies Covert Examinations (3.3.1) and Sources of Information 
(3.3.2) had overlapping content with AFOSI knowledge competencies. However, covert 
examinations and sources of information in AFOSI are not fraud specific concepts. The 
same principles described in these two competencies are applied to all types of 
investigations. As a result, there is not an AFOSI fraud specific competency with which 
to compare the ACFE knowledge competencies Covert Examinations (3.3.1) and Sources 
of Information (3.3.2). However, it was still determined that there is an overlap. The 
ACFE knowledge competency Tracing Illicit Transactions (3.3.3) had overlapping 
content with the AFOSI knowledge competencies FinCEN Reporting (Electronic 
Reports) (1.1) and Financial Profiling Methods (1.3), as both knowledge competency 
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models contained comparable content for this topic. Table 12 provides a listing of all 
knowledge competency gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 3.3 of the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model.  The section following Table 12 discusses the findings. 
Table 12.  ACFE Subsection 3.3 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
3. Investigation
3.3 Gathering Information 
3.3.1. Covert Examinations CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.3.2. Sources of Information CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.3.3. Tracing Illicit Transactions 1.1— FinCEN Reporting 
(Electronic Documents); 1.3— 
Financial Profiling Methods 
Overlap 
(1) FINDING 3-5: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Covert Examinations 
(3.3.1)— Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of guidance in conducting 
undercover operations. This competency includes instruction on tactics for conducting 
such operations, as well as legal considerations related to their execution. Although not 
specific to fraud training, similar content was covered during CITP and AFOSI BSIC 
training. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 3-6: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Sources of Information 
(3.3.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of information on all of the possible 
relevant documents one could utilize in a fraud examination. This includes public and 
non-public records and where to find these records. The competency also discusses the 
different kinds of information one can glean from the various documents and how to 
utilize these documents in a fraud examination. Though not specific to fraud training, 
similar content was covered during CITP and AFOSI BSIC training. Therefore, this 
knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(3) FINDING 3-7: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Tracing Illicit 
Transactions (3.3.3)—Overlap 
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This ACFE knowledge competency consists of guidance on how to identify and 
obtain evidence related to property and assets. This competency specifically looks at 
various methods for tracing illicit transactions as well as how to locate hidden assets. 
Similar content was discovered under AFOSI knowledge competencies, FinCEN 
Reporting (Electronic Documents) (1.1) and Financial Profiling Methods (1.3). 
Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
d. Analyzing Evidence
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 3 (Investigation), subsection 3.4 (Analyzing 
Evidence) identified the following: There were a total of three ACFE knowledge 
competencies listed under subsection 3.4. These were Analyzing Documents (3.4.1), Data 
Analysis and Reporting Tools (3.4.2), and Digital Forensics (3.4.3). The ACFE 
knowledge competencies Analyzing Documents (3.4.1) and Data Analysis and Reporting 
Tools (3.4.3) were found to have overlapping AFOSI knowledge competencies. The 
AFOSI knowledge competencies, How to Conduct Contract File Reviews (2.19) and 
How to Conduct a Contract File Review (3.7), had comparable content with the ACFE 
knowledge competency Analyzing Documents (3.4.1). The AFOSI fraud knowledge 
competency model did not have any knowledge competencies that were comparable to 
the ACFE knowledge competencies Data Analysis and Reporting Tools (3.4.2) and 
Digital Forensics (3.4.3). Table 13 provides a listing of all knowledge competency gaps 
and overlaps identified in subsection 3.4 of the ACFE fraud knowledge competency 
model. The section following Table 13 discusses the findings. 
Table 13.  ACFE Subsection 3.4 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
3. Investigation
3.4 Analyzing Evidence 
3.4.1. Analyzing Documents 2.19— How to Conduct Contract 
File Reviews; 3.7— How to 
Conduct a Contract File Review 
Overlap 
3.4.2. Data Analysis & Reporting 
Tools 
None Identified Gap 
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3.4.3. Digital Forensics None Identified Gap 
(1) FINDING 3-8: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Analyzing Documents 
(3.4.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of instructions related to analyzing 
documents in a fraud examination. This includes what information to look for when 
conducting document analysis, as well as guidance for handling original documents and 
treating them as evidence. Similar content was identified under AFOSI knowledge 
competencies How to Conduct Contract File Reviews (2.19) and How to Conduct a 
Contract File Review (3.7). Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an 
overlap.  
(2) FINDING 3-9: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Data Analysis and 
Reporting Tools (3.4.2)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a discussion on tools and 
procedures for analyzing data. This includes a comparison of data mining and data 
analysis. Additionally, this competency provides guidance on processes and software 
available for use in conducting data analysis. Similar content was not identified under the 
AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model. Therefore, this knowledge competency is 
considered to be a gap. 
(3) FINDING 3-10:ACFE Knowledge Competency: Digital Forensics 
(3.4.3)—Gap 
 This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a discussion on the role of 
computers in a fraud examination. It also provides recommendations on how to obtain 
evidence and supporting information from a computer. Similar content was not identified 
under the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model. Therefore, this knowledge 
competency is considered to be a gap. 
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4. Fraud Prevention and Deterrence 
a. Understanding Crime 
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 4 (Fraud Prevention and Deterrence), subsection 
4.1 (Understanding Crime) identified the following: There were a total of two ACFE 
knowledge competencies listed under subsection 4.1. These were Understanding 
Criminal Behavior (4.1.1) and White Collar Crime (4.1.2). The ACFE knowledge 
competency Understanding Criminal Behavior (4.1.1) was found to have comparable 
content with AFOSI knowledge competencies. However, understanding criminal 
behavior in AFOSI is not fraud specific. The same principles of understanding criminal 
behavior are applied to all types of investigations. As a result, there is not an AFOSI 
fraud specific competency with which to compare the ACFE knowledge competency 
Understanding Criminal Behavior (4.1.1). However, it was still determined that there is 
an overlap. The ACFE knowledge competency White Collar Crime (4.1.2) was found to 
have overlapping content with the AFOSI knowledge competencies Difference Between 
Fraud Scheme & Law Violation (2.20) and Difference Between Administrative 
Deficiencies & Criminal Indicators (2.21). Table 14 provides a listing of all knowledge 
competency gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 4.1 of the ACFE fraud knowledge 
competency model. The section following Table 14 discusses the findings. 
Table 14.   ACFE Subsection 4.1 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
4. Fraud Prevention and Deterrence 
4.1 Understanding Crime 
4.1.1. Understanding Criminal  
Behavior 
CITP/BSIC Overlap 
4.1.2. White Collar Crime 2.20—Differences Between Fraud 
Scheme and Law Violation;  
2.21—Differences Between 





(1) FINDING 4-1: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Understanding Criminal 
Behavior (4.1.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a discussion on what motivates 
people to obey the law, as well as what induces people to commit crimes. Although not 
specific to fraud training, similar content was covered during CITP and AFOSI BSIC 
training. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 4-2: ACFE Knowledge Competency: White Collar Crime 
(4.1.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a discussion on what constitutes 
white collar crime. This competency further looks at the elements and examples of 
organizational crime and occupational fraud. Similar content was identified under AFOSI 
knowledge competencies Differences Between Fraud Scheme and Law Violation (2.20) 
and Differences Between Administrative Deficiencies and Criminal Indicators (2.21). 
Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
b. Fraud Prevention
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 4 (Fraud Prevention and Deterrence), subsection 
4.2 (Fraud Prevention) identified the following: There were a total of three ACFE 
knowledge competencies listed under subsection 4.2. These were Fraud Prevention 
Programs (4.2.1), Fraud Risk Assessments (4.2.2), and Fraud Risk Management (4.2.3). 
All three knowledge competencies had comparable content with AFOSI knowledge 
competencies. The ACFE knowledge competency Fraud Prevention Programs (4.2.1) was 
found to have overlapping content with the AFOSI knowledge competencies Fraud 
Working Group Role (2.3) and Purpose of a Fraud Working Group and Potential 
Members (3.2). The ACFE knowledge competencies Fraud Risk Assessments (4.2.2) and 
Fraud Risk Management (4.2.3) were both found to have comparable content with the 
AFOSI knowledge competency Target Development Cycle (3.1). Table 15 provides a 
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listing of all knowledge competency gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 4.2 of the 
ACFE fraud knowledge competency model. The section following Table 15 discusses the 
findings. 
Table 15.   ACFE Subsection 4.2 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
4. Fraud Prevention and Deterrence 
4.2. Fraud Prevention 
4.2.1. Fraud Prevention Programs 2.3—Fraud Working Group Role;  
3.2—Purpose of a Fraud Working 
Group and Potential Members 
Overlap 
4.2.2. Fraud Risk Assessments 3.1—Target Development Cycle Overlap 
4.2.3. Fraud Risk Management 3.1—Target Development Cycle Overlap 
 
(1) FINDING 4-3: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Fraud Prevention 
Programs (4.2.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of recommendations for programs to 
prevent fraud in the workplace. This includes employee education, prevention policies, as 
well as ethics programs. Similar content was identified under AFOSI knowledge 
competencies Fraud Working Group Role (2.3) and Purpose of a Fraud Working Group 
and Potential Members (3.2). Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be 
an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 4-4: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Fraud Risk Assessments 
(4.2.2)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of instruction on how to proactively 
identify and address an organization’s vulnerabilities to fraud, both internal and external. 
It also discusses how to effectively report the results of a fraud risk assessment, as well as 
address identified vulnerabilities. Similar content was identified under AFOSI knowledge 
competency Target Development Cycle (3.1). Therefore, this knowledge competency is 
considered to be an overlap. 
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(3) FINDING 4-5: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Fraud Risk Management 
(4.2.3)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of instructions on how to prioritize, 
treat, and monitor the risks identified by a fraud risk assessment. This competency further 
provides guidance for establishing and executing an effective fraud risk management 
program within an organization. Similar content was identified under AFOSI knowledge 
competency 3.1, Target Development Cycle. Therefore, this knowledge competency is 
considered to be an overlap. 
c. Ethics and Responsibilities
A comparative analysis of the competencies listed under the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model, section 4 (Fraud Prevention and Deterrence, subsection 
4.3 (Ethics & Responsibilities) identified the following: There were a total of four ACFE 
knowledge competencies listed under subsection 4.3. These were Ethics for Fraud 
Examiners (4.3.1), Corporate Governance (4.3.2), Management Responsibilities (4.3.3), 
and Auditor Responsibilities (4.3.4). The ACFE knowledge competency Ethics for Fraud 
Managers (4.3.1) had overlapping content with AFOSI knowledge competencies. 
However, ethics in AFOSI is not a fraud specific concept. The same principles are 
applied to all types of investigations. As a result, there is not an AFOSI fraud specific 
competency with which to compare the ACFE knowledge competency Ethics for Fraud 
Managers (4.3.1). However, it was still determined that there is an overlap. The AFOSI 
fraud knowledge competency model did not have any knowledge competencies within 
the body of knowledge that were considered comparable to the ACFE knowledge 
competencies Corporate Governance (4.3.2) or Management Responsibilities (4.3.3). The 
ACFE knowledge competency Auditor Responsibilities (4.3.4) had overlapping content 
with the AFOSI knowledge competencies Types of Audit Support (2.27) and Function of 
the Air Force Audit Agency (3.9). Table 16 provides a listing of all knowledge 
competency gaps and overlaps identified in subsection 4.3 of the ACFE fraud knowledge 
competency model. The section following Table 16 discusses the findings. 
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Table 16.   ACFE Subsection 4.3 Comparative Analysis 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
4. Fraud Prevention and Deterrence 
4.3. Ethics & Responsibilities 
4.3.1. Ethics for Fraud 
Examiners 
CITP/BSIC Overlap  
4.3.2. Corporate Governance None Identified Gap 
4.3.3. Management 
Responsibilities 
None Identified Gap 
4.3.4. Auditor Responsibilities 2.27—Types of Audit Support;  




(1) FINDING 4-6: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Ethics for Fraud 
Examiners (4.3.1)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a definition of ethics. This 
competency also discusses how ethics compare with morals and laws. Although not 
specific to fraud training, similar content was covered during CITP and AFOSI BSIC 
training. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
(2) FINDING 4-7: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Corporate Governance 
(4.3.2)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides a definition of corporate governance 
as well as identification of the various players and principles that apply. This competency 
also identifies codes and guidance applicable to corporate governance. Similar content 
was not identified under the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model. Therefore, this 
knowledge competency is considered to be a gap.  
(3) FINDING 4-8: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Management 
Responsibilities (4.3.3)—Gap 
This ACFE knowledge competency consists of a description of the role 
management plays in preventing and addressing fraud within an organization. This 




employee compliance. Similar content was not identified under the AFOSI fraud 
knowledge competency model. Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to 
be a gap.  
(4) FINDING 4-9: ACFE Knowledge Competency: Auditor Responsibilities 
(4.3.4)—Overlap 
This ACFE knowledge competency provides an explanation of the regulations, 
professional standards, and guidance that govern auditors in carrying out their anti-fraud 
related responsibilities. Similar content was identified under AFOSI knowledge 
competency Types of Audit Support (2.27) and Function of the Air Force Audit Agency 
(3.9). Therefore, this knowledge competency is considered to be an overlap. 
Refer to Appendix E for a complete table representing all overlaps and gaps 
identified through the comparative analysis. In addition to the gaps and overlaps 
identified when the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model was compared to the 
ACFE fraud knowledge competency model, multiple AFOSI knowledge competencies 
did not overlap with any of the ACFE knowledge competencies found within the ACFE 
fraud knowledge competency model.  This will be discussed in the following section. 
E. AFOSI COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
When the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model was compared to AFOSI 
fraud knowledge competency model, the comparative analysis disclosed that 10 AFOSI 
knowledge competencies were not addressed in the ACFE Fraud Examiners Manual, and 
therefore, did not have comparable ACFE knowledge competencies. The comparative 
analysis identified that the 10 AFOSI knowledge competencies were either covered in 
Stage 2 of special agent training, BSIC, or in Stage 3, BEP, and will be discussed next. 
1. Stage Two—Basic Special Investigations Course
Eight AFOSI knowledge competencies covered during the second stage of 
training lacked comparable ACFE knowledge competencies. These eight AFOSI 
knowledge competencies consisted of AFOSI Fraud Mission Aspects (2.1), AFOSI 
Purview in Procurement Fraud Involving Civilian Subjects (2.2), Environmental Crimes 
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Information (2.4), Environmental Crimes Procedures (2.5), Environmental Program 
Elements (2.6), Contractual Aspects of the Remedies Program (2.10), Administrative 
Deficiency (2.13) and Methods to Obtain Investigative Documentation (2.26). Table 17 
provides a listing of all AFOSI knowledge competencies that lack comparable ACFE 
knowledge competencies identified in stage two of the AFOSI fraud knowledge 
competency model.  
Table 17.   AFOSI Stage Two (BSIC) Comparative Analysis 




Economic Crime Orientation 
2.1. AFOSI Fraud Mission Aspects None Identified Gap 
2.2. AFOSI Purview in Procurement 
Fraud Involving Civilian Subjects 
None Identified Gap 
Environmental Crimes 
2.4. Environmental Crimes 
Information 
None Identified Gap 
2.5. Environmental Crimes 
Procedures 
None Identified Gap 
2.6. Environmental Program 
Elements 
None Identified Gap 
Fraud Remedies 
2.10. Contractual Aspects of the 
Remedies Program 
None Identified  Gap 
Fraud Statutes 
2.13. Administrative Deficiency None Identified Gap 
Economic Crimes Resources 
2.26. Methods to Obtain 
Investigative Documentation 
None Identified Gap 
 
2. Stage Three—Basic Extension Program 
Two AFOSI knowledge competencies covered during the third stage of training  
lacked comparable ACFE knowledge competencies. The two AFOSI knowledge 
competencies consisted of Documents to Request on a Subpoena (3.6) and Types and 
Uses of Case Status Reports (3.10). Although the Fraud Examiners Manual (from which 
the ACFE knowledge competencies are drawn) touch on the role of subpoenas in an 
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investigation, they are not covered to the same degree as in the AFOSI knowledge 
competencies. Therefore, they are treated as gaps. Table 18 provides a listing of all 
AFOSI knowledge competencies that lack comparable ACFE knowledge competencies 
identified in stage three of the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model. 
Table 18.   AFOSI Stage Three (BEP) Comparative Analysis 




Economic Crimes DL 102 
3.6. Documents to Request on a 
Subpoena 
None Identified Gap 
Economic Crimes DL 104 
3.10. Types and Uses of Case Status 
Reports 
None Identified Gap 
 
Refer to Appendix F for a complete table representing all overlaps and gaps 
identified through the comparative analysis. This comparative analysis provided a 
significant amount of data and raised many questions concerning the reasoning behind 
the identified gaps.  A summary of the findings, as well as potential implications and 
recommendations based on the findings will be discussed in the following section. 
F. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON FINDINGS 
1. Summary of Findings 
The answers to the research questions based on the results of the comparative 
analysis conducted between the ACFE and AFOSI fraud knowledge competency models 
are as follows: 
a. What Are the ACFE Professional Fraud Investigation Knowledge 
Competencies Required for Certification? 
The ACFE fraud investigation knowledge competencies that are required for 
certification form the overall foundation of the Fraud Examiners Manual by volume and 
subsection. There are 45 ACFE knowledge competencies that are covered in the four 
volumes of the Fraud Examiners Manual. Each volume of the manual addresses a 
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different knowledge area. The titles of the volumes are Financial Transactions and 
Fraud Schemes, Law, Investigation, and Fraud Prevention and Deterrence. Each volume 
contains multiple subsections addressing the specific fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies. A full listing of the 45 ACFE knowledge competencies can be found in 
Appendix C.  
b. What Are the AFOSI Fraud Investigation Knowledge Competencies 
Required for Credentialing? 
The AFOSI fraud investigation knowledge competencies required for 
credentialing are derived directly from the AFOSI Career Field Education and Training 
Plan (CFETP) Specialty Training Standard. There are 41 AFOSI knowledge 
competencies total, spread among three stages of training. The first stage of training, 
taught at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is the Criminal 
Investigator Training Program (CITP). The second stage of training, also taught at 
FLETC, is the Basic Special Investigations Course (BSIC), which provides AFOSI 
agency-specific training to prospective agents. The third stage of training is the Basic 
Extension Program (BEP), which occurs during the 15-month Probationary Agent 
Training Program (PATP). A full listing of the 41 AFOSI knowledge competencies can 
be found in Appendix D. 
c. How Do the ACFE and AFOSI Required Fraud Investigation 
Knowledge Competencies Compare? 
The ACFE fraud knowledge competency model consisted of 45 knowledge 
competencies, whereas the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model consisted of 41 
knowledge competencies. In many instances throughout the comparative analysis, 
multiple AFOSI knowledge competencies overlapped with a single ACFE knowledge 
competency.  For this reason, the most accurate assessment of the data is provided when 
the knowledge competencies from both fraud knowledge competency models are 
combined. When the knowledge competencies from the ACFE fraud knowledge 
competency model and the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model are combined, 
there are a total of 86 knowledge competencies between the two models.  Of the total 
 63 
number of knowledge competencies (86), 59 of those had overlaps between the two 
models. This left 27 knowledge competencies between the two models without 
comparable matches, 17 ACFE knowledge competencies and 10 AFOSI knowledge 
competencies. Of the 17 ACFE knowledge competency gaps identified, the ACFE fraud 
knowledge competency model sections that included multiple ACFE knowledge 
competency gaps were Other Fraud Schemes (1.3), Law Overview (2.1), Analyzing 
Evidence (3.4), and Ethics & Responsibilities (4.3). Appendix E provides a complete 
listing of all 17 ACFE knowledge competency gaps identified through the comparative 
analysis. Some of the AFOSI knowledge competency gaps identified included the AFOSI 
Fraud Mission and Aspects (2.1), Environmental Crimes Information (2.4), 
Environmental Crimes Procedures (2.5), Methods to Obtain Investigative Documentation 
(2.26), and Documents to Request on a Subpoena (3.6). Appendix F provides a complete 
listing of all 10 AFOSI knowledge competency gaps identified through the comparative 
analysis. Approximately 68.6 percent of the material covered in the two knowledge 
competency models overlapped, while approximately 31.4 percent of the material did not 
overlap.  Refer to Appendix G, which provides a combined overall comparison of both 
fraud knowledge competency models. 
2. Implications 
 The findings show well over half of the competencies overlapped between the 
two knowledge competency models. This indicates somewhat of a common 
understanding between both knowledge competency models regarding the necessary 
competencies an individual must have in order to adequately investigate fraud. While 
approximately two-thirds coverage can be considered a majority, further explanation is 
warranted to clarify potential causes for the gaps identified in the remaining one-third of 
the ACFE and AFOSI knowledge competencies.  
a. Fraud Mission and Jurisdiction 
One potential cause for the knowledge competency gaps between the ACFE and 
AFOSI fraud knowledge competency models could be attributed to the different missions 
of the ACFE and the AFOSI. The ACFE is a non-governmental organization, comprised 
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of members from a variety of backgrounds, both from government service and private 
industry. To adequately address the variety of individual experience and professional 
purview of each member, the ACFE must cover a greater scope of material in its training. 
In comparison, the AFOSI is a military criminal investigative organization (MCIO) for 
the U.S. Air Force (USAF). As such, its mission is concentrated on those crimes affecting 
USAF personnel and assets. Moreover, due to federal agency jurisdictional 
considerations, investigations into issues such as tax fraud and theft of intellectual 
property would be handled by the appropriate federal agency established to investigate 
such crimes— the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division (IRS-CID) 
and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) respectively in this case. Therefore, 
knowledge competencies covering this material would not need to be included in AFOSI 
anti-fraud training. The same can be stated to explain the ten AFOSI knowledge 
competencies that did not have overlapping ACFE knowledge competencies. While the 
ACFE knowledge competency model covers various facets of procurement fraud, a 
common type of crime associated with government spending, the AFOSI knowledge 
competencies appeared to go more in depth by including such knowledge competencies 
as Contractual Aspects to the Remedies Program (2.10), Administrative Deficiency 
(2.13), and Environmental Crimes (2.4— 2.6).  
b. Purview 
Perhaps a secondary reason identified for the gaps between the ACFE and AFOSI 
fraud knowledge competency models is that the AFOSI does not solely focus on fraud-
related investigations. As mentioned in Chapter III, the AFOSI has six areas of operation 
within its investigative purview (AFOSI, 2014). These six areas of operation create a 
wide spectrum of crimes that the AFOSI is responsible for, including but not limited to 
illegal narcotics, violent crimes, cyber investigations, espionage, and counterintelligence. 
As a result, special agents must be adequately trained and prepared to investigate a 
myriad of crimes. Therefore, the AFOSI training cannot focus exclusively on fraud due to 
a finite amount of time and resources that must be allocated to other types of 
investigations. In contrast, the ACFE is an organization dedicated entirely to fraud, which 
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allows the ACFE to invest all of its time and resources exclusively toward training and 
developing future certified fraud examiners. 
3. Recommendations 
Based upon the previously discussed implications, reasonable explanations, such 
as each organization’s mission and differing purview, exist that address the gaps 
identified between the ACFE and AFOSI fraud knowledge competency models. 
However, it would be prudent to suggest that both organizations have the capacity to 
further limit the amount of knowledge competency gaps. One of the suggestions would 
be to expand the overall number of knowledge competencies covered by each 
organization. Although, as previously mentioned, both organizations are ultimately 
hampered by a finite amount of time and resources, and therefore, cannot realistically 
cover every imaginable aspect of anti-fraud training. 
Another suggestion would be to focus on the challenges presented by 
organizational purview. Properly handling sensitive issues such as criminal investigations 
require an extensive amount of training and experience. With the AFOSI’s wide purview 
of investigative responsibilities, a possible solution to gaps in knowledge competencies 
for every manner of criminal investigations, including fraud, might be to increase the 
number and emphasis placed on subject matter experts for each of the six areas of 
operation. Instead of continual training in all aspects of the AFOSI areas of operation, 
special agents would in fact “specialize” in a specific area. This approach would allow 
for a greater amount of time and resources in a specific area of operation, such as fraud 
investigations, to be invested in a smaller amount of personnel. This approach would then 
justify the inclusion of additional fraud knowledge competencies into mandatory follow-
on training for all individuals selected to fill the role of fraud investigator after they had 
successfully completed the Probationary Agent Training Program (PATP).  
A suggestion the ACFE could implement to address its knowledge area gaps 
would be to generate supplements to the Fraud Examiners Manual. These supplements 
would not necessarily be testable, but would cover material related to military specific 
fraud, including the FAR, administrative remedies, UCMJ, and the roles and 
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responsibilities of the various MCIOS. This would serve as a great resource to both 
military and non-military alike. Large, complex fraud cases are often worked by a mix of 
non-military federal agencies, who typically do not have much experience conducting 
joint investigations with MCIOs. These supplements would offer a source of information 
and clarification to facilitate the various agencies working with one another. 
G. SUMMARY 
Chapter IV provided a comparative analysis of the ACFE and AFOSI fraud 
knowledge competency models. The chapter first provided an overview of the ACFE 
fraud knowledge competency model and the AFOSI fraud knowledge competency model. 
The chapter then discussed the methodology used for conducting the analysis, including 
an explanation of how the various competencies were determined to be gaps or overlaps 
with one another. The chapter then identified and discussed the gaps and overlaps 
between the two bodies of knowledge. The chapter finished with implications and 
recommendations based on the comparative analysis findings. The final chapter will 
present a summary, conclusions, and areas for further research. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will first provide a summary of the background that motivated this 
research project. The chapter will then provide a conclusion and briefly discuss the 
findings based on the analysis related to the research questions initially presented. The 
chapter will also discuss areas for further research. 
B. SUMMARY 
Acquisition and contracting play significant roles in achieving government 
effectiveness and efficiency. Procuring products and services has become a standard 
practice in fulfilling government requirements. The United States Air Force (USAF) 
spends billions of dollars a year on contracts ranging from simple services to major 
weapons systems. In fiscal year (FY) 2014 alone, $18.8 billion was budgeted for 
“blue”—USAF only—procurement (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense/Comptroller, 2013). Government funding for defense acquisition is a finite 
resource, and those entrusted with the authority to obligate taxpayer dollars should do so 
with the greatest responsibility.  
In an effort to establish a system that promotes fiscal responsibility and 
stewardship, the federal government and subordinate agencies, such as the Department of 
Defense (DOD), have utilized a contract management process. The contract management 
process is predicated on statutory requirements and regulations that seek to standardize 
and manage the procurement process to limit fraud, waste, and abuse, and provide the 
end customer with the best product available in a timely manner (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation [FAR] 1.102). 
As with any established process, the contract management process is not immune 
to fraud, waste and abuse. Procurement fraud has been prevalent throughout the history 
of government acquisition (Davidson, 1997). All government agencies must have 
effective controls in place to detect and prevent fraudulent activity within their 
 68 
departments. The USAF established the Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
(AFOSI) to help combat fraud within Air Force procurement channels. The AFOSI took 
on the responsibility of investigating all felony-level crimes involving USAF personnel 
and assets, including fraud and financial crimes. AFOSI special agents assigned to major 
procurement fraud positions are required to possess a distinctive knowledge base due to 
investigative complexities not normally found in general criminal or counterintelligence 
investigations. To address the specialized knowledge required throughout fraud 
investigations, the AFOSI has developed and implemented a set of knowledge 
competencies all special agents must possess to be considered fully qualified, referred to 
throughout the agency as credentialed.  
With ever-changing economic conditions facing every marketplace, the 
importance placed on fraud awareness has considerably increased in the non-government 
sector over the past few decades. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
has quickly emerged as the anti-fraud profession’s leader for fraud 
examination/investigation expertise. The ACFE is now the largest organization in the 
world that specializes in anti-fraud and financial crimes training and education. With 
membership numbering at approximately 75,000, the ACFE is the organization 
recognized for its expertise in anti-fraud education and training (ACFE, 2014b). 
The continuous improvement and development of personnel is a large part of the 
foundational pillar of the AFOSI (“AFOSI Mission, Vision, & Vector,” n.d.). To 
objectively compare the current AFOSI competencies, this research project uses the 
ACFE Fraud Examiners Manual as the professional standard body of knowledge in terms 
of curricular and knowledge required for fraud examination and certification. The goal of 
this research was to extend the AFOSI foundation by addressing gaps and overlaps 
between AFOSI and ACFE fraud investigation knowledge competencies, hereafter 




The answers to the research questions based on the results of the comparative 
analysis conducted between the ACFE and AFOSI knowledge competency models are as 
follows: 
1. What are the ACFE professional fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies required for certification? 
The ACFE professional knowledge competencies that are required for 
certification form the overall foundation of the Fraud Examiners Manual by volume and 
subsection. A full listing of the 45 ACFE knowledge competencies can be found in 
Appendix C. 
2. What are the AFOSI fraud investigation knowledge competencies required 
for credentialing? 
The AFOSI fraud investigation knowledge competencies required for 
credentialing are derived directly from the AFOSI Career Field Education and Training 
Plan (CFETP) Specialty Training Standard. A full listing of the 41 AFOSI knowledge 
competencies can be found in Appendix D. 
3. How do the ACFE and AFOSI required fraud investigation knowledge 
competencies compare? 
The ACFE knowledge competency model consisted of 45 knowledge 
competencies, whereas the AFOSI knowledge competency model consisted of 41 
knowledge competencies. Of the total number of knowledge competencies (86), 59 of 
those had overlaps between the two models. This left 27 knowledge competencies 
between the two models without comparable matches, which included 17 ACFE 
knowledge competencies and 10 AFOSI knowledge competencies. Of the 17 ACFE 
knowledge competency gaps identified, the ACFE fraud knowledge competency model 
sections that included multiple ACFE knowledge competency gaps were Other Fraud 
Schemes (1.3), Law Overview (2.1), Analyzing Evidence (3.4), and Ethics & 
Responsibilities (4.3). Appendix E provides a complete listing of all 17 ACFE knowledge 
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competency gaps identified through the comparative analysis. Some of the AFOSI 
knowledge competency gaps identified included the AFOSI Fraud Mission and Aspects 
(2.1), Environmental Crimes Information (2.4), Environmental Crimes Procedures (2.5), 
Methods to Obtain Investigative Documentation (2.26), and Documents to Request on a 
Subpoena (3.6). Appendix F provides a complete listing of all 10 AFOSI knowledge 
competency gaps identified through the comparative analysis. Approximately 68.6 
percent of the material covered in the two knowledge competency models overlapped, 
while approximately 31.4 percent of the material did not overlap.  Refer to Appendix G, 
which provides a combined overall comparison of both fraud knowledge competency 
models. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research provided in this report identified similarities and differences 
between the fraud knowledge competencies established by the AFOSI and the ACFE. 
The findings in this report lay the groundwork for further research. There are three 
particular areas of further research that could be built upon the findings in this research. 
First, this research was conducted comparing fraud knowledge competencies 
between the AFOSI and the ACFE. Further research could be conducted comparing the 
AFOSI’s fraud knowledge competencies with those of other Military Criminal 
Investigative Organizations (MCIO). A similar research topic would be to compare the 
AFOSI’s fraud knowledge competencies with those of other non-military federal 
investigative agencies. 
A second area for further research would center on the ACFE. Having compared 
the AFOSI knowledge competencies with those of the ACFE, a subsequent area for 
research would be to compare the fraud knowledge competencies of other MCIOs with 
those of the ACFE. By the same token, another research topic could be to compare the 
ACFE fraud knowledge competencies with those of other non-military federal 
investigative agencies. 
A final area for further research would look at the impact(s) of the identified 
knowledge gaps and the reality of trying to close the identified gaps. One research topic 
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could be an attempt to determine whether the knowledge gaps cause a negative impact to 
the AFOSI in being able to execute its mission or the ACFE in being able to provide the 
appropriate resources and training. Another research topic could look at the true cost(s) 
and requirement(s) of trying to close the knowledge gaps. A third research question might 
look at determining whether or not the AFOSI and/or the ACFE would actually benefit 
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APPENDIX A. FRAUD TREE 
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APPENDIX B. APPROVED PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS 
Professional 
Certification 
Acronym Source Agency 
Accredited in Business 
Valuation 
ABV American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) 
Anti-Money Laundering 
Professional 
AMLP BAI Center for Certifications 
Accredited Senior Appraiser ASA American Society of Appraisers 
(ASA) 
Accredited Valuation Analyst AVA National Association of Certified 
Valuation Analysts (NACVA) 




CAMS The Association of Certified 
Anti-Money Laundering 
Specialists 
Certified Bookkeeper CB American Institute of 
Professional Bookkeepers (AIPB) 
Certified Bank Auditor CBA Bank Administration Institute 
Certified Bank Compliance 
Officer 
CBCO Bank Administration Institute 
Certified Financial Analyst CFA American Academy of Financial 
Management 
Certified Fire and Arson 
Investigator 
CFAI International Security and 
Detective Alliance 
Certified Forensic Financial 
Analyst 
CFFA National Association of Certified 
Valuation Analysts (NACVA) 
Certified Financial Planner CFP Institute of Certified Financial 
Planners 
Certified Financial Services 
Auditor 
CFSA The Institute of Internal Auditors 
Certified General Accountant CGA Certified General Accountants 
Association of Canada 
Certified Government Auditing 
Professional 
CGAP The Institute of Internal Auditors 
Certified Government 
Financial Manager 
CGFM Association of Government 
Accountants 
Certified Internal Auditor CIA Institute of Internal Auditors 
Certified Insurance Fraud 
Investigator 
CIFI International Association of 
Special Investigation Units 
Certified International 
Investigator 
CII Council of International 
Investigators 
Certified Information Privacy 
Professional 
CIPP International Association of 
Privacy Professionals 
Certified Information Systems 
Auditor 
CISA Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA) 
Certified Information Security 
Manager 
CISM Information Systems Audit and 




Acronym Source Agency 
Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional 
CISSP The International Information 




CITP American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) 




CMA Institute of Certified Management 
Accountants 
Certified Public Accountant CPA American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) 
Certified Protection Officer CPO International Foundation for 
Protection Officers (IFPO) 
Certified Protection 
Professional 
CPP International Foundation for 
Protection Officers (IFPO) 
Certified Protection 
Professional 
CPP American Society for Industrial 
Security 
Certified Risk Professional CRP BAI Center for Certifications 
Certified Systems Professional CSP Institute for Certification of 
Computing Professionals 
Computer Systems Security 
Professional 
CSSP International Association for 
Computer Systems Security, Inc. 
Certified Valuation Analyst CVA The National Association of 
Certified Calculation Analyst 
Information Security Specialist 
Examination 
SC METI and Information-
Technology Promotion Agency, 
Japan 
Small and Medium Enterprise 
Management Consultants 
SMEC The Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency, METI Japan 
Information Systems Security 
Administrator 
SU Information-Technology 
Promotion Agency, Japan 
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APPENDIX C. ACFE FRAUD KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCY 
MODEL 
ACFE FRAUD KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCY MODEL 
Competency 
Designator 
Task, Knowledge, and Technical Reference Core 
Task 
1. Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes 
1.1. Financial Transactions 
1.1.1 Accounting Concepts Yes 
1.2. Occupational Fraud Schemes 
1.2.1 Financial Statement Fraud Yes 
1.2.2 Asset Misappropriation  Yes 
1.2.3 Cash Receipts Yes 
1.2.4 Fraudulent Disbursements Yes 
1.2.5 Inventory/Other Assets Yes 
1.2.6 Bribery & Corruption Yes 
1.3. Other Fraud Schemes 
1.3.1 Financial Institution Fraud Yes 
1.3.2 Check/Credit Card Fraud Yes 
1.3.3 Theft of Intellectual Property Yes 
1.3.4 Insurance Fraud Yes 
1.3.5 Health Care Fraud Yes 
1.3.6 Consumer Fraud Yes 
1.3.7 Computer/Internet Fraud Yes 
1.3.8 Contract/Procurement Fraud Yes 
2. Law 
2.1. Overview 
2.1.1 Overview of US Legal System Yes 
2.1.2 The Law Related to Fraud Yes 
2.1.3 Bankruptcy Fraud Yes 
2.1.4 Securities Fraud Yes 
2.1.5 Money Laundering Yes 
2.1.6 Tax Fraud Yes 
2.2. Punishing Offenders 
2.2.1 Criminal Prosecutions Yes 
2.2.2 Civil Justice System Yes 
2.3. Practice & Procedure 
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2.3.1 Individual Rights During Examination Yes 
2.3.2 Basic Principles of Evidence Yes 
2.3.3 Testifying as an Expert Witness Yes 
3. Investigation 
3.1. Investigation Procedures 
3.1.1 Planning & Conducting a Fraud Examination Yes 
3.1.2 Report Writing Yes 
3.2. Interviewing 
3.2.1 Interview Theory & Application Yes 
3.2.2 Interviewing Suspects & Signed Statements Yes 
3.3. Gathering Information 
3.3.1 Covert Examinations Yes 
3.3.2 Sources of Information Yes 
3.3.3 Tracing Illicit Transactions Yes 
3.4. Analyzing Evidence 
3.4.1 Analyzing Documents Yes 
3.4.2 Data Analysis & Reporting Tools Yes 
3.4.3 Digital Forensics Yes 
4. Fraud Prevention & Deterrence 
4.1. Understanding Crime 
4.1.1 Understanding Criminal Behavior Yes 
4.1.2 White Collar Crime Yes 
4.2. Fraud Prevention 
4.2.1 Fraud Prevention Programs Yes 
4.2.2 Fraud Risk Assessments Yes 
4.2.3 Fraud Risk Management Yes 
4.3. Ethics & Responsibilities 
4.3.1 Ethics for Fraud Examiners Yes 
4.3.2 Corporate Governance Yes 
4.3.3 Management Responsibilities Yes 











APPENDIX D. AFOSI FRAUD KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCY 
MODEL 
AFOSI FRAUD KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCIES 
Competency 
Designator 
Task, Knowledge and Technical Reference Core 
Task 
STAGE 1 - CITP 
1.1 FinCEN Reporting (Electronic Reports) Yes 
1.2 Title 18 U.S.C. 1956/1957 (Money Laundering) Yes 
1.3 Financial Profiling Methods Yes 
1.4 Elements of Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud and Transportation 
Across Interstate Lines  
Yes 
STAGE 2 - BSIC 
Economic Crime Orientation 
2.1 AFOSI Fraud Mission Aspects Yes 
2.2 AFOSI Purview in Procurement Fraud Involving Civilian 
Subjects 
Yes 
2.3 Fraud Working Group Role Yes 
Environmental Crimes 
2.4 Environmental Crimes Information Yes 
2.5 Environmental Crimes Procedures Yes 
2.6 Environmental Program Elements Yes 
Fraud Remedies 
2.7 Criminal Aspects of the Remedies Program Yes 
2.8 Civil Aspects of the Remedies Program Yes 
2.9 Administrative Aspects of the Remedies Program Yes 
2.10 Contractual Aspects of the Remedies Program Yes 
Fraud Statutes 
2.11 Fraud Criminal Statutes Yes 
2.12 Fraud Civil Statutes Yes 
2.13 Administrative Deficiency Yes 
2.14 Issues Relevant to Proving Intent in Fraud Investigations Yes 
Procurement Process Overview 
2.15 Phases of the Acquisitions Cycle Yes 
2.16 Legally Binding Contract Yes 
2.17 Contract Types Yes 
2.18 Contract Requirements/Specifications Yes 
2.19 How to Conduct Contract File Reviews Yes 
Fraud Schemes 
2.20 Difference Between Fraud Scheme & Law Violation Yes 




2.22 Product Substitution Scheme Yes 
2.23 Public Corruption Scheme Yes 
2.24 Mischarging/Defective Pricing Schemes Yes 
2.25 Fraud Indicators Yes 
Economic Crimes Resources 
2.26 Methods to Obtain Investigative Documentation Yes 
2.27 Types of Audit Support Yes 
STAGE 3 - PATP/BEP 
Economic Crimes DL 101 
3.1 Target Development Cycle Yes 
3.2 Purpose of a Fraud Working Group and Potential Members Yes 
Economic Crimes DL 102 
3.3 Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations Yes 
3.4 How to Create a Fraud Investigative Plan Yes 
3.5 Fraud Schemes and Statutes  Yes 
3.6 Documents to Request on a Subpoena Yes 
Economic Crimes DL 103 
3.7 How to Conduct a Contract File Review Yes 
3.8 Federal Acquisition Regulation Yes 
3.9 Function of the Air Force Audit Agency Yes 
Economic Crimes DL 104 




APPENDIX E. COMPLETE TABLE OF ACFE & AFOSI 
KNOWLEDGE COMPETENCY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
FINDINGS 
LEGEND 
Gap -  Overlap -  AFOSI Non-Fraud Related 
Overlap - 
 
ACFE Knowledge Competency AFOSI Knowledge Competency Gap/Overlap 
1. Financial Transactions & Fraud Schemes 
1.1. Financial Transactions 
1.1.1. Accounting Concepts None Identified Gap 
1.2. Occupational Fraud Schemes 
1.2.1. Financial Statement Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.2.2. Asset Misappropriation 3.5. Fraud Schemes and Statutes Overlap 
1.2.3. Cash Receipts 3.5. Fraud Schemes and Statutes Overlap 
1.2.4. Fraudulent Disbursements None Identified Gap 
1.2.5. Inventory/Other Assets CITP Overlap 
1.2.6. Bribery & Corruption 2.23. Public Corruption Schemes Overlap 
1.3. Other Fraud Schemes 
1.3.1. Financial Institution Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.2. Check/Credit Card Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.3. Theft of Intellectual 
Property 
None Identified Gap 
1.3.4. Insurance Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.5. Health Care Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.6. Consumer Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.7. Computer/Internet Fraud None Identified Gap 
1.3.8. Contract Procurement 
Fraud 
2.15. Phases of the Acquisitions Cycle, 2.16. Legally 
Binding Contracts, 2.17. Contract Types, 2.18. 
Contract Requirements/Specifications, 2.22. Product 
Substitution, 2.24. Cost Mischarging/Defective 
Pricing, 2.25. Fraud Indicators & 3.5. Fraud 




2.1.1. Overview of the U.S. 
Legal System 
Non-Fraud Related CITP& BEP Knowledge 
Competencies 
Overlap 
2.1.2. The Law Related to Fraud 1.4. Elements of Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud and 
Transportation Across Interstate Lines, 2.9. 
Administrative Aspects of the Remedies Program, 
2.11. Fraud Criminal Statutes, 2.12. Fraud Civil 
Statutes, 2.14. Issues Relevant to Proving Intent in 
Fraud Investigations, 3.3. Prosecutorial Jurisdiction 
in Fraud Investigations, 3.8. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation  
Overlap 
2.1.3. Bankruptcy Fraud None Identified Gap 
2.1.4. Securities Fraud None Identified Gap 
2.1.5. Money Laundering 1.2. Title 18 U.S.C. 1956/1957 (Money Laundering) Overlap 
2.1.6. Tax Fraud None Identified Gap 
2.2. Punishing Offenders 
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2.2.1. Criminal Prosecutions for 
Fraud 
2.7. Criminal Aspects of the Remedies Program, 3.3. 
Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations 
Overlap 
2.2.2. Civil Justice System 2.8. Civil Aspects of the Remedies Program, 3.3. 
Prosecutorial Jurisdiction in Fraud Investigations 
Overlap 
2.3. Practice & Procedure 
2.3.1. Individual Rights During 
Examination 
Non-Fraud Related CITP, BSIC& BEP Knowledge 
Competencies 
Overlap 
2.3.2. Basic Principles of 
Evidence 
Non-Fraud Related CITP, BSIC& BEP Knowledge 
Competencies 
Overlap 
2.3.3. Testifying as an Expert 
Witness 




3.1. Investigation Procedures 
3.1.1. Planning & Conducting a 
 Fraud Examination 
3.4 - How to Create a Fraud 
 Investigative Plan 
Overlap 
3.1.2. Report Writing BSIC Overlap 
3.2. Interviewing 
3.2.1. Interview Theory & 
 Application 
CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.2.2. Interviewing Suspects & 
 Signed Statements 
CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.3 Gathering Information 
3.3.1. Covert Examinations CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.3.2. Sources of Information CITP/BSIC Overlap 
3.3.3. Tracing Illicit Transactions 1.1 – FinCEN Reporting (Electronic Documents); 
1.3 – Financial Profiling Methods 
Overlap 
3.4 Analyzing Evidence 
3.4.1. Analyzing Documents 2.19 – How to Conduct Contract File Reviews; 3.7 – 
How to Conduct a Contract File Review 
Overlap 
3.4.2. Data Analysis & Reporting 
Tools 
None Identified Gap 
3.4.3. Digital Forensics None Identified Gap 
4. Fraud Prevention and Deterrence 
4.1 Understanding Crime 
4.1.1. Understanding Criminal  
Behavior 
CITP/BSIC Overlap 
4.1.2. White Collar Crime 2.20 – Differences Between Fraud Scheme and Law 
Violation;  
2.21 – Differences Between Administrative 
Deficiencies and Criminal Indicators 
Overlap 
4.2. Fraud Prevention 
4.2.1. Fraud Prevention 
Programs 
2.3 – Fraud Working Group Role;  
3.2 – Purpose of a Fraud Working 
Group and Potential Members 
Overlap 
4.2.2. Fraud Risk Assessments 3.1 – Target Development Cycle Overlap 
4.2.3. Fraud Risk Management 3.1 – Target Development Cycle Overlap 
4.3. Ethics & Responsibilities 
4.3.1. Ethics for Fraud 
Examiners 
CITP/BSIC Overlap  






None Identified Gap 
4.3.4. Auditor Responsibilities 2.27 – Types of Audit Support;  
3.9 – Function of the Air Force Audit Agency 
Overlap  
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APPENDIX F. COMPLETE TABLE OF AFOSI KNOWLEDGE 
COMPETENCIES WITHOUT COMPARABLE ACFE KNOWLEDGE 
COMPETENCY MATCHES 




Economic Crime Orientation 
2.1. AFOSI Fraud Mission Aspects None Identified Gap 
2.2. AFOSI Purview in Procurement 
Fraud Involving Civilian Subjects 
None Identified Gap 
Environmental Crimes 
2.4. Environmental Crimes 
Information 
None Identified Gap 
2.5. Environmental Crimes 
Procedures 
None Identified Gap 
2.6. Environmental Program 
Elements 
None Identified Gap 
Fraud Remedies 
2.10. Contractual Aspects of the 
Remedies Program 
None Identified  Gap 
Fraud Statutes 
2.13. Administrative Deficiency None Identified Gap 
Economic Crimes Resources 
2.26. Methods to Obtain 
Investigative Documentation 
None Identified Gap 
3. BEP 
Economic Crimes DL 102 
3.6. Documents to Request on a 
Subpoena 
None Identified Gap 
Economic Crimes DL 104 
3.10. Types and Uses of Case Status 
Reports 
None Identified Gap 
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APPENDIX G. COMBINED ACFE & AFOSI COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS MATRIX 
The below model displays every ACFE and AFOSI knowledge competency by 
competency number designator, for a total of 86 knowledge competencies.  All ACFE 
knowledge competencies run on the vertical axis and all AFOSI knowledge competencies 
run on the horizontal axis.  The ACFE (17) and AFOSI (10) knowledge competency 
designators found in the red box do not have a respective overlapping knowledge 
competency, totaling 27 knowledge competency gaps. The ACFE (28) and AFOSI (31) 
knowledge competencies highlighted in green had at least one overlapping knowledge 
competency, for a total of 59 overlapping knowledge competencies.  The darker green 
boxes mark the knowledge competency where the two bodies of knowledge intersect.  
Finally, the AFOSI knowledge competency located in the very last column (far right) 
entitled “NF” represents the non-fraud AFOSI competencies that overlapped with various 
ACFE knowledge competencies. These non-fraud AFOSI knowledge competencies are 
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